Health Bill (Eighth sitting)
House of Commons · Public Bill Committees · 30 Jun 2026 · 111 speeches · Official Report
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Chairs: Sir Roger Gale, Dr Rupa Huq, Emma Lewell, † Sir Jeremy Wright
† Argar, Edward (Melton and Syston) (Con)
† Brackenridge, Sureena (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)
† Chambers, Dr Danny (Winchester) (LD)
Daby, Janet (Lewisham East) (Lab)
† Foody, Emma (Cramlington and Killingworth) (Lab/Co-op)
Irons, Natasha (Croydon East) (Lab)
† Johnson, Dr Caroline (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)
† Kyrke-Smith, Laura (Aylesbury) (Lab)
† Morgan, Helen (North Shropshire) (LD)
† Prinsley, Dr Peter (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)
† Robertson, Dave (Lichfield) (Lab)
† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
† Smyth, Karin (Minister for Secondary Care)
† Stafford, Gregory (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
† Twist, Liz (Blaydon and Consett) (Lab)
† White, Jo (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
Sanjana Balakrishnan, Rob Cope, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill Committee
Tuesday 30 June 2026
(Morning)
[Sir Jeremy Wright in the Chair ]
Health Bill
Clause 22
Joint planning by integrated care boards and their partners
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause updates the National Health Service Act 2006 to abolish the requirement for integrated care boards and their partner NHS trusts to prepare and publish a joint forward plan and a joint capital resource use plan. The 10-year health plan aims to simplify local healthcare planning, and the Bill delivers that objective by removing legal requirements for integrated care partnerships, integrated care strategies, joint forward plans and joint capital resource use plans. Planning will now begin with the joint strategic needs assessment, developed by health and wellbeing boards. The assessment will inform a new neighbourhood health plan, replacing the joint local health and wellbeing strategy. ICBs will produce population health improvement plans, aligning multiple joint strategic needs assessments, neighbourhood health plans and local priorities across their wider populations. As a result, the planning process will be streamlined and less bureaucratic, and will deliver healthcare for local people based on local planning and strategy. I commend the clause to the Committee.
As the Minister said, the clause removes the need for ICBs and their partner trusts to produce a joint forward plan. The existing legislation requires ICBs and their partner trusts to prepare a plan setting out how they propose to exercise their functions over five years, which is reviewed and/or revised each financial year. Joint forward plans address objectives in the Government mandate regarding the ambitions in the NHS long-term plan and planning guidance. Section 14Z52 of the 2006 Act sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts have to prepare such a plan before the start of each financial year and specifies what the plan must give regard to, including the ICB’s discharge of its duties-general duties and financial duties-under other sections of the Act. The plan must also cover steps that will be taken to implement the local health and wellbeing strategy, the particular needs of young people, and the particular needs of victims of abuse. ICBs and their partner trusts must publish the plan and give it to a set of specified authorities, and NHS England may give directions for that. Section 14Z54 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must consult people when developing such plans and that health and wellbeing boards must be involved. Section 14Z55 sets out that the relevant health and wellbeing board may give an opinion, and that when it does so, it must provide it to the ICB and its partner trusts. Section 14Z56 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must...
I thank the shadow Minister for her comments. I largely agree about legislative plumbing-that is a nice phrase. As she rightly highlights, and as is clear in the explanatory notes and so on, the duplication and administrative burden on all these bodies is considerable. On her question about objectives, we certainly want to streamline that so that ultimately, as well as organisations knowing the objectives they are pursuing, the local population-importantly to her concluding point-can readily see and address that, follow it through and hold people to account. I do think that 150-page documents are not always the easiest to see. Young people will obviously be part of the joint strategic needs assessment, and ICBs will be mindful of the Government’s wider policy objectives, as we have discussed previously. With regard to maintenance and prioritisation of capital schemes, since coming into office we have already done a huge amount of work to streamline the relationship between NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care-and, indeed, our friends over at His Majesty’s Treasury-in respect of the approvals process, making better use of capital and making that more transparent at local level so that individual organisations are involved in the prioritisation that comes forward to the ICBs. Question put and agreed to. Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 23 Abolition of integrated care partnerships and strategies Question proposed, That the...
The clause abolishes the requirement for ICBs and their partner local authorities to form an integrated care partnership. It also abolishes the related requirement for that partnership to prepare and publish an integrated care strategy. These abolitions address the policy objectives of the 10-year health plan by streamlining the number of plans that must be created by local health systems and supporting key local stakeholders to work together more flexibly and effectively. The changes recognise that in many areas, integrated care partnerships have not had a positive impact on local health outcomes and have come with significant opportunity costs. Alternative planning approaches proposed elsewhere in the Bill and more broadly will enable local health bodies to plan for their patients in a way that is tailored to their strengths. However, I can reassure the Committee that where existing arrangements are working well, nothing in the Bill will prevent local areas from coming together to consider how best to integrate services and plan their approach to tackling the challenges they face. I commend the clause to the Committee.
In essence, the clause abolishes integrated care partnerships and strategies, which are where ICBs come together with local authorities to discuss how they can make their services more integrated. We know that many of the challenges facing the NHS are caused by difficulties in social care provision and some of the difficulties in social care provision are caused by issues with health provision, and that if those commissioning services in those two areas work together, we can see an improvement in both. The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 made changes to local government structures and enhanced public involvement in health services. Section 116 requires local authorities to produce joint strategic needs assessments for the local authority and its partner ICB. When preparing the assessment, the local authority and its partner ICB must “co-operate with one another…have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State…involve the Local Healthwatch organisation”, and involve local people and the relevant district councils. I note that later in the Bill we will also come to the abolition of Healthwatch. Section 116 of the 2007 Act has been modified by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Health and Care Act 2022 to ensure that references match the current NHS structure. For instance, in 2008 there were primary care trusts, rather than ICBs. Section 116ZA of the 2007 Act requires ICBs and local authorities whose areas coincide or overlap to...
Will my hon. Friend reflect on the fact that, even if the Government get through the combined mayoral authorities they are trying to in this Parliament, there are still great swathes of England where there are no active plans for a mayoral authority at all. Even if the Government get their own way, some areas will not have a mayor for many years-if they get one at all.
My hon. Friend is, as ever, correct. The mayors are also not all responsible for health and social care-the local authorities are, in most cases. There could therefore be a mayor directing proceedings with the ICB who is a political opponent of those actually democratically elected to look after social care. ICBs are supposed to be apolitical commissioners accountable to the Secretary of State, but now, instead of working with social care directors, they will work with an elected mayor instead. I can see a positive to that in terms of democratic accountability, but what happens if they all disagree? There is some incoherence about who is in charge. We have the local authority tasked with delivering social care, which may be led by one political party; the mayor directing the ICB, who may be of a different political party; and the Secretary of State who can also direct the ICB, who may again be of a different political persuasion. How does it work if they disagree? Does the mayor actually have authority, given that the Secretary of State can override them anyway? How does the Minister see that working in practice? It feels like some people will be in power without responsibility and others will have responsibility without the power to exercise it.
I will raise some similar concerns about the abolition of integrated care partnerships and integrated care strategies, which clause 23 brings about. Before I do, I should declare my interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. The removal of integrated care partnerships, as well as the extension of ICBs to cover multiple local authorities, raises unanswered questions about the future of social care planning, which is very important to the Liberal Democrats, as the Minister knows. We feel that it removes the voice of charities and others in the voluntary sector who are crucial to meeting the range of needs in health and social care. Throughout the Bill there is a theme of separating social care and the NHS, at a time when greater integration and closer working are clearly needed. We heard Sir Andrew Dilnot say in evidence that we cannot deal with some of the challenges that arise in the NHS-particularly around flow through hospitals and long waits in corridor care in accident and emergency-without improving the discharge of patients into social care. Separating the organisations that deliver those things is clearly problematic. If we think about it, as the shadow Minister just outlined, we have lost the local authority representative on ICBs. The Bill also changes the way the better care fund is administered. With those changes, we are really concerned about the separation of these two responsibilities. I want to draw the Minister’s attention to an...
The impact of those two organisations having challenged budgets is that the delivery of continuing care causes real conflict; both of those organisations are trying to manage demand downwards because it affects their budgets so profoundly. The conflicts between the two organisations are only going to get worse if they do not have a mechanism for working closely together and resolving them.
I am concerned about this clause and the general move in the Bill to separate the two organisations. I hope the Minister will be able to describe to us how she will ensure that social care is not lost from ICB planning. Local authorities do not have a big enough say, and the decision to split Healthwatch’s local functions between ICBs and local authorities continues that theme. A lot of people who report concerns to Healthwatch are stuck in the hand-off between the NHS and social care provision from the local authority, and as the Bill envisages it, they will not even have one body to report those concerns back to. That separation of social care planning is a theme of the Bill.
Does the hon. Member share my concern that what often gets billed as simply streamlining or efficiencies is in fact slimming down, decoupling and weakening?
We cannot see the resources allocated, so we cannot confirm that, but it is clearly a concern. We are not yet discussing the part of the Bill that deals with Healthwatch, so I should keep my powder dry, but we know that local authorities will get some additional funding to deal with their elements of Healthwatch, while ICBs will not. There is a concern that that streamlining is, in fact, slimming down.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I want to pick up where the shadow Minister left off. Essentially, she said that the cart is being put before the horse in terms of mayoral authorities. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East outlined, many areas have no plans for a mayoral authority; our area of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight is some way down the track. As I expressed last week in Committee, we have a strange anomaly in the new Surrey and Sussex ICB, because Sussex will get a mayor and Surrey will not, so Sussex residents will have representation on the ICB whereas Surrey residents will not. I hope that the Minister has had a chance to reflect on that strange paradox over the weekend and that she will now be able to answer specifically, as she did not last week, how that lack of representation for Surrey residents will work locally. The abolition of the integrated care partnerships and their allied strategies continues a theme whereby the Government, under the veneer of slimming down, are actually decoupling-or weakening or whatever terminology Members wish to use-health and social care. For many years, all parties have regarded the bringing together of health and social care as essential, but the Bill not only looks like it is not trying to encourage that bringing together, but in fact is doing the opposite of that-it seems to be looking to pull them apart and decouple them. That is strange, because it does not appear to be the...
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. There is a consensus-not just in this room, but within Parliament and going back several decades-that we want more integration and partnership working, particularly to bring together health and social care services, but this clause drives a coach and horses through that, and does so in a way that weakens rather than strengthens the Government’s plans to replace the system. Local authorities bear responsibility for social care and public health in their areas, but they will no longer have a direct voice when it comes to integrated care boards. What we have seen to date is not an ideal system, or even a system that works particularly well, so I understand that the Government want to strengthen it, but we should not do that by removing the local government voice or making it indirect via a mayor who does not have the direct responsibility for delivering social care locally. Mayors may have some strategic oversight, but that is different. Just last week, the Minister of State for Care appeared before the Health and Social Care Committee and was questioned on this very issue by me and others. His view was that the mayoral strategic partnership would be more than sufficient to make up for the local authorities losing their seat, but he faced particular scrutiny from the hon. Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Ben Coleman), who made some excellent points, which I will not repeat or paraphrase as they are on public record....
There has been a wide-ranging discussion on this clause. I remind Members that the abolition of ICPs is about reducing that complex legal framework, allowing for local decisions and putting partnership work in place in the most effective way. That is what the measure seeks to do. I do not think anyone has disagreed with the notion that the landscape is complex, and that people are producing a lot of reports. In future, health and wellbeing boards will be the focal point for the collaboration between ICBs and local authorities. They are statutory committees that bring together the NHS, local government and relevant community partners; set the strategic direction for health and care services; and oversee joint working in their area, which we are of course committed to making work in local areas. I do not think many people will disagree with that; I hope that is clear. There is also an enhanced role, not only for the health and wellbeing boards-as I said last week, I think they have been underutilised in most areas; again, I do not think people generally disagree with that point-but for health scrutiny. Again, across the country, that has not been pursued to the greatest extent to create links with elected councillors in local areas. We are clear that the role of local authorities is crucial at a local level-as the name describes-and particularly in working on our commitment for neighbourhood partnerships and developing the neighbourhood plan; most of that was covered in our...
Can the Minister set out how she envisages health scrutiny committees having genuine teeth? Our cross-party health scrutiny committee in Leicestershire universally condemned a decision by the ICB-totally disagreed with it-and the ICB basically said, “Thank you; noted,” and carried on anyway.
We all have examples of decisions that are made in our constituencies that we do not like. Again, that is part of the democratic process, but I go back to my earlier point: either there is a centralised unaccountable body like NHS England making decisions, or the Secretary of State devolves those responsibilities. It is incumbent on people and elected leaders locally, and the ICB, which is not elected, to work with local leaders on these decisions. ICBs will be held accountable through mechanisms in the Department of Health and Social Care. There will be decisions that people do not like-that is a consequence of some of these things-but the clause simplifies the landscape.
Will the Minister give way?
I will not; we need to move on from this point. Of course, if people want to keep the partnerships, they are totally able to do so. That will be up to local leaders to decide. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Neighbourhood health plan
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 70- Duty to engage primary care providers in integrated care boards - “(1) An integrated care board must take all reasonable steps to secure the meaningful involvement of primary care providers in the exercise of its functions relating to- (a) service redesign, (b) integration of health services, (c) development of neighbourhood health services, and (d) population health planning. (2) In this section, ‘primary care providers’ includes- (a) providers of primary medical services, (b) community pharmacy contractors, (c) providers of primary dental services, and (d) providers of ophthalmic services. (3) Under subsection (1), ‘meaningful involvement’ includes- (a) involvement at an early stage in the development of ICB proposals, (b) provision of sufficient information to enable informed participation of primary care providers in ICB functions, (c) opportunities for primary care providers to influence ICB decision-making, and (d) opportunities for primary care providers to deliver feedback on how their views have been taken into account in the delivery of ICB functions. (4) An integrated care board must publish an annual statement describing- (a) how it has complied with this section, and (b) the impact of primary care providers’ involvement on decisions taken by the ICB. (5) The Secretary of State may issue guidance about the application of this section to which integrated care boards must have regard.” This new clause...
Clause 24 abolishes the requirement for health and wellbeing boards to prepare and publish a joint local health and wellbeing strategy. Instead ICBs, local authorities and their partners must work together through the health and wellbeing board to develop a neighbourhood health plan, in line with this Government’s commitment in the 10-year health plan. The neighbourhood health plan should be updated regularly to reflect the needs of the local population, unless all partners consider the existing plan is sufficient. In developing their neighbourhood health plans, responsible local authorities and partner ICBs must involve the people who live or work in the area of the responsible local authority. The neighbourhood health plan will cover most of the topics previously considered by joint local health and wellbeing strategies, but will also encourage a deep focus on tackling the challenges facing individual neighbourhoods. That may mean applying different geographical focuses to different elements of the plan, to ensure that planners are addressing the real and different needs of the diverse communities they serve. These plans will outline how the NHS, local government and local partners intend to improve the health of people in their locality and reduce health inequalities through a joined-up neighbourhood health approach. The plans will consider how local services can help realise national NHS priorities, further public service reforms, and improve performance against the...
Clause 24 puts neighbourhood health plans on a statutory basis. Currently, section 116A of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 requires local authorities and partner ICBs to prepare a joint local health and wellbeing strategy once they have received their integrated care strategy. Essentially, that means that the ICBs and local authorities produce their overall strategy, then it devolves down, and then the joint health and wellbeing strategy looks at how it will be delivered. The local authority and its partners must give regard to the integrated care strategy, the NHS England mandate and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. The strategy must be published and local people and the local Healthwatch must be involved in its development. Section 116B of the 2007 Act places a duty on local authorities and partner ICBs to have regard to various strategies when exercising their function, specifically, a joint strategic needs assessment, an integrated care strategy and a joint local health and wellbeing strategy. NHS England also has regard to these when providing healthcare for a specific area. Clause 24 changes the JLHWS to a neighbourhood health plan. In many ways, that aligns with the shift in the Government’s 10-year health plan from hospital to community. As they have described it, more care in the neighbourhood will allow hospitals to focus on the more specialist care that may be needed, so more people can be cared for closer to home,...
It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I have been itching to speak on this new clause, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire)-I am not sure how to pronounce that, but I am sure it is a very beautiful place; I have never been. It would ensure that a certain range of primary care providers were consulted by integrated care boards in the development of the healthcare plans. The recent King’s Fund report, as well as many others, showed that over 90% of NHS contact with patients is in primary care in all its forms. New clause 70 relates to new clause 60, also tabled by my hon. Friend, which is about having GP representation on integrated care boards. This is an extension of that, so that dentists, pharmacy contractors and providers of ophthalmic services can all feed into integrated care boards’ healthcare plans. That is how most people come into contact with the NHS, which means that those providers have a close and deep understanding of the healthcare issues facing the demographics in their communities.
New clause 70 talks about a certain range of primary care providers being consulted by the ICB. Can the hon. Member clarify whether it is his intention for all providers of those services in a defined area to be consulted, or would it be a representative selection? If it is the latter, how would they be chosen?
The hon. Lady makes a good point. The purpose is to ensure that those who are deeply embedded in community care are consulted by the ICBs, so that they do not miss obvious localised issues in their demographics when developing care plans. Just to give a brief example from a surgery I held recently, Joanne Cook is an occupational therapist who is campaigning for occupational therapists who have received specific training to be able to prescribe, and crucially de-prescribe, medications, in the same way that trained paramedics can. Often, occupational therapists see patients on a daily basis. They give them intimate and regular care, and are even better placed than GPs to notice small changes and adjust medications to keep people out of hospital. If integrated care boards are not drawing on the experience, knowledge and data from primary care providers in all their forms, any healthcare plans they come up with will not be relevant to those demographics. We will not be keeping people out of hospital or treating them as effectively in the community, and the whole system will not be as efficient or as targeted as it could be. I would appreciate it if the Minister considered accepting the new clause.
I am not convinced that clause 24 delivers the transformation that the Minister claims. At its core, it appears to be little more than a rebranding exercise. It replaces joint local health and wellbeing strategies with neighbourhood health plans, but does remarkably little to strengthen the underlying duties on local authorities or integrated care boards. Merely changing the name of a document does not improve patient outcomes, reduce waiting lists or deliver more integrated care. The duty created by the clause is also remarkably weak. Local authorities and ICBs need only prepare a plan and then “have regard” to it when exercising their functions. That is one of the least demanding obligations available in legislation. It requires consideration, not compliance. An ICB could acknowledge the plan, but decide to depart from it and still satisfy the legal test. If neighbourhood plans are genuinely intended to drive local health policy, the Bill should do a lot more to require decision makers to act in accordance with them, or at the very least to explain publicly why they have chosen not to. I am also concerned that the clause creates additional bureaucracy without any clear accountability. It requires the production of another planning document, another consultation exercise and another set of reporting expectations, but provides for no-for want of a better phrase-enforcement mechanism or measurable outcomes against which success can be judged. There is a risk that local...
For example, new clause 70(2) says:
“In this section, ‘primary care providers’ includes”
-“includes”, not “is limited to”-a list of four different groups of people. The hon. Member then started to talk about occupational therapists. Will occupational therapists, physiotherapists and every possible health and social care provider of any speciality, and none, be included in that list? As the shadow Minister pointed out, how will these people be selected, on what basis, and in what proportion? While great intentions lie behind the new clause, the detail of how it would actually work is, as ever, entirely absent.
New clause 70(3) states:
“Under subsection (1), ‘meaningful involvement’ includes”
a list of four things, which, to be honest, are entirely woolly-things like “opportunities”.
The hon. Member will be aware that the new clause is a probing amendment. It is designed to push the Minister to describe how we will ensure that this range of expertise is taken into account when the plans are put together. We will not press the new clause to a vote, but we want to use it as a discussion point to probe how the range of expertise in the health service will be fully utilised, so that the plans are the best they can be.
I thank the hon. Lady for that clarification. It is helpful to understand that the Liberal Democrats will not press the new clause to a vote, but if we are to use probing amendments effectively, they need to be drawn much more tightly, so that a Minister does not have the opportunity-I am sure that today’s Minister would not do this-to wriggle out of it because it is so poorly drafted.
What we are desperately trying to do is ensure that we are drawing on the expertise of primary care providers. The hon. Member seems not to understand that talking about 40 new hospitals the whole time with no plan to deliver them is looking at the wrong end of the health service. We need to try to keep people healthy and in the community. The new clause is an attempt to refocus thoughts on keeping people healthy in the community, rather than talking about hospitals that never existed.
We can go back to the record in Hansard , but I do not remember mentioning anything to do with hospitals in what I just said; I may have had some sort of amnesia at that point. If the hon. Member is referring to the plan of the last Government, which was fully costed, for 40 new hospitals, then I am afraid I did not mention that. On his wider point, Conservative Members want to understand how local authorities and deliverers of primary care-dental services and so on-will be included and can have influence over the plans and strategies that ICBs draw up. I fully support that ambition; I just feel that, if we are to have that ambition, we need to table amendments and new clauses that the Minister might actually accept, so that we can go forward.
I thank hon. Members for their comments. I accept those made by the hon. Members for Winchester and for North Shropshire. I offer the Liberal Democrats the assurance that the Government fully appreciate the important role that primary care plays in informing ICB decisions, which is why we have retained the requirement that ICBs engage with their system partners, including primary care services, in the exercise of their planning and commissioning activities. It is universally recognised that full engagement with providers, including primary care, is fundamental to good commissioning, and this is reflected in the strategic commissioning framework. The neighbourhood health framework sets out how neighbourhood health plans should be developed through health and wellbeing boards and with the involvement of system partners. We expect primary care to be fully involved in the process. In addition, ICBs will continue to engage local representative primary care committees, such as the local medical committees. ICBs must comply with their duty to obtain appropriate advice from persons who have broad professional expertise in prevention, diagnosis or treatment of illness and the protection or improvement of public health. Primary care practitioners will remain key sources of such advice. Although I agree that experience of general practice is fundamental-as a commissioner, I worked very closely with general practitioners, who deal with 90% of patient contacts-I do not believe that...
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider clause 26 stand part.
Clause 25 makes focused but important changes to the accounting and audit arrangements for NHS trusts by amending schedule 4 to the National Health Service Act 2006. It does not put additional burdens on NHS trusts; instead, the aim of the clause is to align the requirements for trusts with the updated accounting arrangements for foundation trusts made elsewhere in the Bill. The changes are needed as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members. The amendments the clause makes replicate trusts’ existing duties to keep proper accounts and records about those accounts, and to prepare annual accounts for each financial year. The clause also replicates the Secretary of State’s current power to direct an NHS trust regarding the form of its annual accounts, but extends that power of direction so the Secretary of State may also direct a trust to prepare accounts for a specified period-for example, when part-period accounts are needed. That will help to ensure a consistent approach to financial reporting while retaining the flexibility to keep requirements up to date. The clause also sets out and strengthens how the audit arrangements for NHS trusts should operate, mirroring the approach for foundation trusts and integrated care boards. It provides that NHS trust annual accounts are audited under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, as is the case currently, but it also...
As has been said, clause 25 specifies how NHS trusts should handle their accounting. Paragraph 11A of schedule 4 to the NHS Act 2006 sets out the current obligations, which are that the trust must keep proper accounts, that the Secretary of State may give directions about how the accounts are held, and that the accounts must be prepared annually, may be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and must be submitted to NHS England. Clause 25 replaces paragraph 11A entirely. Under the new provisions, the reporting goes to the Secretary of State, instead of NHS England-which seems sensible, because the Government are abolishing NHS England-and the Secretary of State may give directions about “methods and principles”, as well as the “form and content”. The Secretary of State may also give directions about specified periods in which accounts are to be prepared. Will the Minister explain why those provisions are felt to be necessary? There will be suspicion among some more cynical people that the power to specify periods could be used to be more flattering for the Government, or that methods and principles could be used to change the perception of the position. Can the Minister give an example of where she thinks such periods would be useful, and also say why she thinks it is necessary to enable the Secretary of State to give directions about methods and principles, and form and content, in a way that is not done at the moment? The exception for charitable trusts of which...
If there are specific examples that are helpful, I will write to the hon. Lady-I am not entirely sure I got the point about charities, but we will pick that up in Hansard. As I outlined in my opening remarks, these clauses are about standardising the key requirements across the NHS provider landscape in relation to annual and other accounts and records in relation to those, and audit and reporting requirements, including keeping those up to date and having a consistent approach across all NHS provider types. Of course, we worked closely with NHS England colleagues and directors of finance in seeking to bring forward those provisions. Question put and agreed to. Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 27 Special Health Authorities: establishment and exercise of functions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider clause 28 stand part.
Clauses 27 and 28 make amendments to the legal framework around special health authorities to give the Secretary of State the flexibility to best manage the reliable delivery of healthcare for patients and the public. As the Committee knows, special health authorities are independent bodies established by the Secretary of State, by order, to perform specific functions. They play a key national role in the health system, carrying out specific functions on behalf of the Secretary of State. Clause 27 does two key things to the special health authority legal framework. First, it amends section 28 of the NHS Act 2006 to increase the scope of functions that a special health authority could be established to deliver. Currently, the Secretary of State can create a special health authority only for the purpose of exercising functions under the 2006 Act. The clause allows a special health authority to be established to exercise functions under any other Act as well. Secondly, the clause amends section 29 of the 2006 Act, which currently enables regulations to provide for the functions of a special health authority to be carried out flexibly, by another special health authority or jointly with one or more other special health authorities. That applies only to functions that the Secretary of State has directed the special health authority to exercise under section 7 of the 2006 Act. The clause removes that limitation, so that those arrangements can be made for any functions of the...
Special health authorities are, in essence, specialist health authorities set up by the Secretary of State, usually to provide an England-wide service of some form. Examples include NHS Blood and Transplant, and the NHS Business Services Authority, which provides NHS pensions-I should declare that I have an NHS pension-admin for prescription exemptions and other such business-type functions. We also have NHS Resolution, which deals with clinical negligence claims, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. In principle, special health authorities are useful in some cases, but they are effectively a form of quango. Can the Minister explain when she thinks the Government might want to set up a special health authority, rather than using a department within the DHSC to deliver the same thing? There are plenty of other nationally delivered services, and although the Government have suggested that some services, such as screening, will become localised as part of the Bill, some things will remain national. Can the Minister give some examples of what the new provision will be used for? I can see there is provision for flexibility, but the special health authorities would require setting up, and there are set-up costs and costs associated with branding and those sorts of things. How does the Minister envisage those costs being provided for, and when will it be necessary for the Government to use them rather than just using the Department? Special health authorities have been created,...
Very briefly, on clauses 27 and 28, I am sure the Committee is aware that special health authorities were initially established under the National Health Service Act 1977. Since then the number of special health authorities has expanded and contracted a number of times over the years to leave us with, currently, NHS Blood and Transplant, and the Business Services Authority, which covers pensions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham mentioned-I should declare that I have an NHS pension, albeit a very small one-as well as the NHS Litigation Authority, also known as NHS Resolution, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. The mood music and the direction of travel, certainly since 2006, has been to reduce the number of special health authorities. On my reading, clauses 27 and 28 suggest that the Government are potentially looking to expand the number of special health authorities, given the Secretary of State’s direction under clause 27 and the practical steps for staff transfers in clause 28. Is the Minister looking at, for example, a special health authority to deal with artificial intelligence? Clearly that is something the NHS will have to embrace-or deal with, depending on which end of the AI argument one is on-rapidly over the coming years. Is that a potential area for a special health authority? Perhaps the Minister could outline where she sees the special health authorities acting and what their remits might be.
To be clear, in response to the comments of the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, it is not currently our intention to set up any new special authorities to deliver any specific functions. We are taking this opportunity to update the legislative framework and ensure that in future the functions that a special health authority could carry out are less limited. The current legislative framework limits the remit of such authorities to their functions under the NHS Act 2006, which is outdated and does not reflect changes since that time. There are functions of the Secretary of State under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 that we may want special authorities to carry out in future. I agree with the Opposition spokesperson that the situation is complex. We have had a lot of changes over many years, as both she and the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said. I agree that we need flexibility for future provision, and that is what the clauses provide. We have no immediate intention to delegate specific functions of the Secretary of State. However, following the abolition of NHS England, a range of functions may need to be established, as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon outlined. Those functions could, as an example, include the data and information functions in part 9 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which currently sit with the Secretary of State. I assure the Committee that the clauses do not change the existing processes or...
The Chair
We now come to group 24, and amendment 73 to clause 29 tabled by Charlie Maynard. Does any Member wish to move amendment 73? With that not being so, the question becomes that clause 29 stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 80, leave out paragraphs 5 to 8. This amendment would retain the requirement for NHS Trusts to have a Council of Governors. Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 80, leave out paragraph 14. This amendment would retain the requirement for NHS Trusts to have a Council of Governors. Government amendment 19. Amendment 36, in schedule 3, page 82, line 3, at end insert- “(1A) The function under sub-paragraph (1) must be exercised by a person employed in the civil service of the State, and a Minister of the Crown or a special adviser must not be involved in any decision relating to such an appointment, suspension or removal.” This amendment would ensure that civil servants are responsible for the decision making and appointment processes for trust and ICB leaders, rather than Ministers or Special Advisers. Schedule 3. Clause 30 stand part. New clause 59- Independence of appointments - “The Secretary of State must make provision to ensure that operational decisions regarding the appointment, suspension or removal of- (a) chairs and directors of NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts, and (b) chief executives of integrated care boards, are made exclusively by persons employed in the civil service.”
Amendment 19 reinstates in primary legislation the requirement in schedule 7 to the National Health Service Act 2006 for an NHS foundation trust board to include one executive director who is a medical or dental practitioner, and another who is a registered nurse or midwife. I want to be clear to the Committee from the outset that there was never any intention to change the policy on the clinical membership of NHS foundation trust boards. Foundation trusts would still have been expected to have appropriate clinical leadership on their boards, but we had heard from ambulance foundation trusts that the current framing of the requirement for clinicians is not always helpful, and greater flexibility was therefore required. However, we also heard from important stakeholders, including the Royal College of Nursing, that removing the requirement from primary legislation has been perceived as deprioritising clinicians, which is absolutely not the case. We have therefore tabled amendment 19 to remove any doubt. These roles provide valuable clinical oversight of board governance in decision making in foundation trusts, and are essential to ensuring the safety and quality of patient-facing services in the NHS. At the same time, some providers may need different clinical expertise at board level. For example, in ambulance trusts, an experienced paramedic may be better placed to provide the relevant clinical guidance and oversight. The amendment therefore gives the Secretary of State a...
The Chair
Order. Forgive me; let me interrupt to explain. I asked if anyone wished to move amendment 73, and no one did. We will come to amendments 74 and 75, so the Minister is welcome to speak to those amendments now or at the end of the debate if she wants to. Other members of the Committee may wish to move those amendments subsequently.
Thank you for the clarification, Sir Jeremy. I will come to amendment 75 at the end of the debate. The Bill’s removal of councils of governors from NHS foundation trusts is part of delivering the 10-year health plan goal of hospitals putting patient experiences and outcomes at the heart of their decision making. That is not because we want to rid the system of local voices in democratic accountability-far from it. Although governors have provided helpful advice and oversight for some foundation trusts, we expect the next generation of NHS foundation trusts to put in place more responsive and flexible arrangements for drawing on patient, staff and stakeholder insight. Rather than a one-size-fits-all model, providers should develop engagement arrangements that reflect their local populations, geographies and healthcare needs. Foundation trusts will have the option to retain aspects of their engagement model where it is working well, but can take a different approach if needed. Following Royal Assent, foundation trusts will be expected to have those arrangements in place and will be assessed as part of the non-statutory advanced foundation trust process. Schedule 3 makes related changes to governance and decision making, in line with the Government’s policy to streamline oversight of providers and reduce duplication in the system. For example, the legal powers to appoint chairs and non-executive directors of foundation trusts and NHS trusts will, in future, both sit with the...
The Chair
Yes, we are debating all the provisions in this group together, so the Minister is welcome to speak to clause 30 now or later, when she winds up.
Thank you, Sir Jeremy. Clause 30 clarifies how NHS foundation trust status will be applied for and granted following the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the council of governors model. The Government are committed to reinvigorating the foundation trust sector by granting high-performing providers greater freedoms and autonomy. The power to authorise foundation trusts originally sat with Monitor and passed to NHS England in 2022. The clause, alongside schedules 3 and 11, sets out how that power will operate when it transfers to the Secretary of State. It also makes consequential amendments to the authorisation process, including removing requirements linked to recruiting members and electing governors. The Secretary of State will also set the criteria for becoming a foundation trust. I commend the clauses and the schedule to the Committee.
This is quite a large group. First, clause 29 introduces schedule 3, which will make changes to the constitution of NHS foundation trusts. Currently, chapter 5 of the National Health Service Act 2006 establishes NHS foundation trusts as public benefit corporations in accordance with schedule 7 to the Act. That schedule, “Constitution of public benefit corporations”, sets out, among other things, the requirements for a constitution, the eligibility for membership, and the council of governors. Schedule 3 to the Bill, introduced by clause 29, has a number of functions. First, it modifies the 2006 Act so that a foundation trust will no longer be a public benefit corporation, but will now be a body corporate-I would be interested in the Minister’s explanation of that change. It also modifies section 33(4) of the 2006 Act to remove reference to councils of governors, so that trusts no longer need to set those up, and modifies section 37 so that an NHS foundation trust can amend its constitution with the approval of the Secretary of State, where previously, that would have required a vote of more than half the members of the board of directors and more than half the members of the council of governors. The schedule also deletes section 39A of the 2006 Act, “Panel for advising governors”, because one presumes if there are no governors, they do not need advice. It modifies section 43, “Provision of goods and services”, so that if a foundation trust wishes to raise its non-NHS income...
I wish to speak to amendment 36 and new clause 59, which are different ways of seeking to do the same thing. They are aimed at ensuring that “civil servants are responsible for the decision making and appointment processes for trust and ICB leaders, rather than Ministers or Special Advisers.” In earlier sessions, we spoke about the risk of political capture; the amendment and new clause intend to deal with that. The Government’s intention is to give providers more freedom to design services around local needs, but we are worried that giving the Secretary of State the powers to appoint trust chairs and non-executive directors will undermine that local flexibility and agency. It risks creating a bottleneck in the Department for Health and Social Care, leaving foundation trusts waiting for approval to make their arrangements. In theory, the Secretary of State will be responsible for the appointment of 143 foundation trust chairs and roughly 1,000 foundation trust non-executives, who themselves will appoint the executive directors. Clearly, there is the potential for a bottleneck there. We also think that in the hands of the wrong Secretary of State-I cast no aspersions about the current one-there is potential for mass manipulation of the make-up of future NHS leadership. I think everybody here would agree that NHS leaders should be the best possible people for the job, not those who best fit the political agenda of the Secretary of State of the day. We are worried that future...
Will the hon. Lady give way?
I had finished speaking, but I will give way and think of something else to say.
The civil servants will be under the direction of the Minister, so how does the hon. Lady envisage it working? Presumably, civil servants are there to deliver for their Ministers or Secretary of State? Is she suggesting that makes the decision more impartial? Can she give us some detail on how that will work?
As I mentioned in my previous remarks, one imagines that a Secretary of State would set out criteria to ensure that the best people for the job are appointed. We are in a situation where a current Parliament cannot bind a future one, but we do need to set a precedent that political capture of these important leadership roles is not an unintentional consequence of this legislation. I accept that it is unintentional; I think the Secretary of State and the Minister have drafted this legislation with the best of intentions, but this is something we should guard against.
On clause 29 and the relevant amendments, the membership model and the council of governors were originally introduced to give patients, staff and local communities a formal voice in the governance of NHS organisations. I worry that by removing them the clause concentrates power in the hands of the trust board at a local level and, potentially, the Secretary of State at a national level, while reducing opportunities for local scrutiny and public participation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, there is a real danger that organisations will be independent in name only. That brings us back to the never-ending tension in the Bill between the centralisation of power in the Secretary of State, through the abolition of NHS England and all the other bodies we have talked about, and the Government’s stated desire to have more accountability for decision making at a local level.
I am aware of the role of governors in some of our NHS trusts and the way in which they are appointed, but governors have said to me that they are sometimes disappointed by the level of influence they can in fact have in their trust. Can the hon. Member think of examples of where governors have particularly influenced the activities of individual trusts? I have not found that to be the case in my experience.
The hon. Gentleman’s intervention neatly brings me to my next point. I have some sympathy for his viewpoint-and apparently the viewpoint expressed to him by governors-that in many cases, if not most, governors do not have the teeth, the influence or the ability to change things in the way they would like. My argument is very similar to the one we will expand on later regarding the abolition of the Healthcare Services Safety Investigations Branch and Healthwatch: the Government’s response to something not working as effectively as it could is to abolish it, but why not give those organisations the teeth-the powers-to achieve the things they were set up to do, unless the hon. Gentleman and the Government feel that there is no need, in Healthwatch’s case, for that level of independent scrutiny or, in governors’ case, that level of independent influence on boards? There is a fundamental difference here: the Conservatives would take something imperfect and make it better; the Government’s response is to take something imperfect and abolish it. That is the wrong way round.
Does my hon. Friend think that this leaves a bit of a gap? The Secretary of State will not have the level of local oversight that the governors had, so how will that local oversight feed into the Secretary of State so that he or she can make the decisions instead?
My hon. Friend is right that there will be a gap in local decision making on these issues. It goes back to that tension I described some moments ago: the Government’s stated intention is to devolve powers locally, but they seem to be pulling so much power up to the Secretary of State that we will lose the ability to make local decisions for the benefit of local populations where appropriate. We have a stated ambition for neighbourhood health, but those neighbourhoods are rapidly expanding in this legislation to become areas of millions of people. Local people who are interested in their local health delivery or local hospital trust would not see that as local decision making, and there is the gap that my hon. Friend describes. I do not think that amendments 74 and 75 have been moved, so I will not talk about them. Government amendment 19 will require “NHS foundation trusts to have at least one executive director who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist and another who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife.” As also stated in the explanatory note, and as the Minister mentioned, regulations may create exception-for example, for ambulance trusts. That is the right decision, and it is important that we have medical experience on foundation trust boards. I am interested in understanding from the Minister, first, why she has chosen a medical practitioner or registered dentist. Does she see some equivalence in their expertise that could be...
I think I am almost going to agree with the hon. Gentleman on his final point. It is important that local people have confidence in how their local systems are run and managed and, clearly, in the outcomes. I will come first to the issue of governors and boards and then move to the amendments. I think we have all had emails, as is quite right, from local board members. Let me say, as I did earlier, that that is with good intent; they are very good people, who have given public service to be part of their local health system. As I said, this provision is no judgment on them; it is, as we heard, about effectively making the really important patient voice and patient experience central to the functions of the organisations delivering our healthcare. As I said in previous sittings, a debate will continue to be had about where we most effectively have that, but our intention throughout the 10-year health plan and this Bill is about devolution to providers and to ICBs and about making boards, as I also said in a previous sitting, responsible and accountable for the outcomes. Let me outline broadly, because I think this is of interest to people, the impact on governance and the role that governors had. Just to be clear, since the creation of foundation trusts in 2004, NHS England-and, before it, NHS Improvement and Monitor-has had a statutory role to oversee the governance of NHS foundation trusts, including holding the whole board to account and taking steps where it identifies...
We are developing an approach that sets out what that might look like in practice. The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said that this principle-there is perhaps a disagreement in the Opposition-runs through other areas. For example, a better approach to local engagement would reflect local demographics and geography better than a one-size-fits-all governor model. We would also be more likely to focus on the outcomes of engagement, looking to see if there is evidence that local people are involved in key decisions regarding how care is provided and how their voice is listened to.
To be clear, all NHS trusts and foundation trusts will continue to be expected to put in place effective arrangements for engaging patients, staff and the local community, as set out in section 242 of the NHS Act 2006. To ensure their effectiveness, we will test providers’ engagement arrangements as part of ongoing assurance processes, including provider capability assessments, Care Quality Commission well-led assessments and the assessment process for advanced foundation trust status.
On the question of the right level of clinical representation, our amendment 19 is clear that clinical and medical representation is fundamental to the work of those boards. It is important that boards reflect that clinical and medical work, although it will be for them to determine the right balance.
Will the Minister give way?
I will move on, if I may. I think my response will the cover the issues raised in the debate. On amendment 36 and new clause 59, I note the concern that the Secretary of State could act inappropriately when making appointments to the boards of ICBs and NHS trusts and foundation trusts. We discussed democratic accountability in a previous sitting, and at the end of the day it is up to the British public whom they elect to Parliament and as the governing party. Transparency and democratic accountability are at the heart of our reforms. It would not be right for the civil service to be given sole legislative responsibility for appointments to NHS trusts, foundation trusts or integrated care boards. Ministers are democratically accountable to Parliament, and civil servants act on their behalf under the Carltona principle. Civil servants serve and advise the Government, and act on behalf of Ministers, but it is for Ministers to take decisions and to be held accountable to Parliament for the performance of the NHS. The civil service will run fair, open and equitable campaigns to fulfil these roles and will recommend appropriate candidates to Ministers. Ministers are under a duty to comply with public law principles and to act reasonably, and will adhere to the Nolan principles, including objectivity, transparency and integrity, in discharging this function. The practical arrangements for appointments are being developed as part of the transition planning for the integration of NHS...
Will the Minister give way?
The Chair
I think the Minister has finished. Question put and agreed to. Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Amendment made: 19, in schedule 3, page 81, line 10, at end insert- “(1A) Unless or except to the extent that regulations provide otherwise, the executive directors must include- (a) at least one person who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist (within the meaning of the Dentists Act 1984), and (b) at least one other person who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife.”- (Karin Smyth.) This requires NHS foundation trusts to have at least one executive director who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist and another who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife. Regulations may create exceptions (for example, an exception could be created for ambulance foundation trusts). Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to. Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 31 NHS foundation trusts etc: audit of accounts Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Schedule 4. Clauses 32 to 34 stand part.
I will address clauses 31 to 34 and schedule 4 together. Clause 31 ensures that NHS foundation trusts are subject to the same robust, transparent audit regimes as other NHS bodies. Together with schedule 4, clause 31 makes provision about the audit of NHS foundation trust accounts, which is needed as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for NHS foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members. Schedule 4 does that by removing the current bespoke provisions related to the auditing arrangements for the accounts of foundation trusts and amends the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 so that foundation trusts are subject to the auditing regime under that Act. This means that foundation trusts will in future be subject to the same auditing requirements as trusts and integrated care boards, ensuring a clear, consistent and transparent framework for local audit across NHS provider organisations. Taken together, these measures strengthen consistency in financial reporting and audit assurance across the NHS provider sector, while preserving the independence of the local audit process. Clause 32 repeals provisions of the NHS Act 2006, requiring NHS England to maintain a register of NHS foundation trusts and a power to charge fees related to maintaining the register. The register formed a repository of documents that related to how foundation trusts were governed and regulated. However, removing the requirements does not mean...
The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).
Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.