National Security (State Threats) Bill
House of Lords · Lords Chamber · 30 Jun 2026 · 147 speeches · Official Report
Committee
Scottish legislative consent correspondence published . Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Constitution Committee .
Clause 1: Designation of bodies involved in foreign power threat activity
Amendment 1
Moved by
1: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, after “activity” insert “including espionage” Member's explanatory statement This probing amendment seeks to clarify whether all aspects of espionage are covered by the reference to “foreign power threat activity”, in the light of the recent conviction of two Chinese spies, one of whom worked for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has other relevant amendments in this group. Amendment 1 is a probing amendment that enables the Minister to clarify the exact breadth of the intention in the Bill-a Bill that I welcome, and I regret I was not able to be here at Second Reading to say so. The Bill is designed to address the threat posed by foreign state-linked organisations that operate here in the UK. My amendment relates in particular to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, whose office manager, Bill Yuen, was recently convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison under the National Security Act 2023 for helping to run a CCP surveillance operation from its premises. The existence of this office dates back to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Act 1996, passed on the premise that Hong Kong was meaningfully autonomous from Beijing. “One country, two systems” was meant to mean that separate legal, economic and administrative systems would be permitted in Hong Kong, albeit as part of China. Any such pre-1997 autonomy or even post-1997 freedoms are clearly no longer the case, yet somehow the office survives, supposedly independent of the Chinese embassy but with at least one of its staff acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. This has involved surveillance of some of our own citizens and of Hong Kong dissidents resident in the UK. Indeed, Regina Ip,...
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. This builds on the Private Notice Question which she placed before your Lordships’ House and indeed on our Second Reading debate last week where the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, which, as the noble Baroness has rightly said, is a relic of the past, became the centre of our interest because of some of those who worked there being convicted of being involved in espionage on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party regime in Beijing. That is why it is entirely relevant to this Bill and why it is good that the noble Baroness has placed Amendment 1, this probing amendment, before your Lordships’ Committee. I have a few points I would like to make on that amendment before turning to my own Amendments 3 and 4, which deal with slightly different questions but are also linked to the malign activities of the Chinese Communist Party regime in the UK. Amendment 3 deals with transnational repression, and Amendment 4 deals with the activities of the United Front, which is not a state but works in line with the wishes and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. That is why it is problematic in terms of the definitions in the Bill and why I have sought further clarification through my amendments. I have a few pointers on the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office case, which might be helpful to your Lordships. In May 2024, law enforcement initially arrested 11 individuals across the UK. Only three of those were...
On Amendment 3, we recommended in our report that we should adopt a formal definition of “transnational repression” and that we should systematically collect data and develop monitoring mechanisms. We agreed with James Lynch, the co-director of FairSquare, who told the committee that we were missing a
“big opportunity to … monitor and analyse the trends and then develop a coherent strategy”.
He said our failure to do this
“risks … emboldening authoritarian regimes to escalate TNR activities”.
The report calls for international co-operation with other democracies-we mention the example of Canada -in combating TNR, and we make some specific recommendations about the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPs as they are called, and the misuse of Interpol red notices. Closer to home, the JCHR called for a national hotline for victims, more systematic, specialised training for police officers, and to identify the early warnings of TNR. I again commend that report to the whole Committee, and I urge the Minister, when he replies, to reiterate the promise that he gave yesterday: that, before the end of July, he will engage again with the Joint Select Committee on the points that are adumbrated in the report and mentioned in Amendment 3.
I turn to Amendment 4. I see that the Government Whips are looking nervous. I do not want to delay the Committee, but I did not group these amendments together; that was a matter for the Government. I did not want to ungroup the amendments, as that would take extra time. Amendment 4 seeks to introduce a vital and urgent statutory refinement to Section 31 of the National Security Act 2023. Noble Lords will recall that, when we debated that Bill, there was a collective sense of pride in the House that we were finally equipping our intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies with a framework fit to confront contemporary state threats. We are very fortunate to have my noble friends Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Carlile of Berriew present in your Lordships’ Committee again today. In the past, they have been the advisers to the Government on these important questions.
However, as the operational reality of the National Security Act has unfolded, we have been forced to confront a significant, highly sophisticated structural vulnerability, and our laws remain ill-equipped to deal with the asymmetric, centralised doctrine of what Beijing terms its “United Front” political warfare. Let us be entirely clear about what “United Front” work is: it is not benign cultural diplomacy but a core political strategy of the CCP aimed at neutralising opposition, building coalitions and leveraging individuals outside the party to advance its domestic and geopolitical goals. Mao Zedong famously termed the United Front one of the CCP’s “three magic weapons” to defeat its enemies. Decades later, Xi Jinping has reinvigorated this weapon, describing it as an essential tool for the
“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.
I could go on at great length, and I know that I would be reprimanded if I thought to do so. If unamended, the statutory framework struggles to establish the necessary thresholds of state agency against actors operating out of an official, physical state trade office, so what chance does it have of dealing with non-bureaucratic proxy networks such as those exemplified by the United Front? That is why Amendment 4 is necessary. The United Front is a strategy, not a corporate organisation. Even if it were designated, it would leave the broader network entirely untouched and legally insulated. Amendment 4 would provide a surgical and precise solution. It would give prosecutors the latitude to meet the foreign power condition simply by establishing that the prohibited conduct was carried out in alignment with a formal, published and authenticated foreign power policy that directs interference.
There are no unintended consequences here. I know that the Minister has been listening to the arguments, because I met him again today and he showed enormous courtesy and patience in dealing with this. I am only sorry that we have not had longer in Committee, where we could have debated these points in granular detail, rather than at this breakneck pell-mell speed. There is an old saying that if you legislate in haste, you end up repenting at leisure. Let us hope that repentance will not be required on this occasion.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for what they said. They both spoke in very measured terms and I wish to support broadly everything that they have said, for two reasons: first, because I agree with them, and, secondly, because I was too late to co-sign their amendments. The only point of difference I have with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is some thoughts about SLAPPs legislation-I confess that, yes, I am a member of the defamation Bar and I have various views about the questions that lie behind the excitement around the need to introduce SLAPPs legislation, but that is not for today. I broadly agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness and give them the encouragement that, simply because a Conservative Member of this House has not signed their amendments, that does not mean that a Conservative does not agree with them. There is a danger that we can become naive, thinking that because there are, say, 2 billion buyers of toothbrushes in the People’s Republic of China it would be wrong of us to criticise the Chinese Government when they do things, either through their own agencies or through their proxy agencies, to damage the well-being of this country. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, calmly pointed out, not everything is always as it seems. Therefore, although neither the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, nor the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has threatened a vote on their amendments, I urge my noble friend the Minister-and he is...
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 5, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. This amendment seeks to ensure that our national security framework is not only addressing the threats of today but is prepared for what the director-general of MI5 has described as “the next frontier”-the potential risks posed by non-human autonomous AI systems. While our current debate focuses largely on human adversaries and their proxies who seek to undermine our national security, we must now also grapple with the emergence of systems capable of evading human oversight and control. We are drawing a distinction between the AI tools we use today and what experts term artificial superintelligence, or ASI. The amendment defines ASI as a system “capable of adapting its behaviour, in response to … its … environment, in ways not fully specified in advance by its developers”. As Lord Browne of Ladyton, a former Secretary of State and expert on non-proliferation, has explained previously, the key distinction is that ASI would be an agent rather than an instrument. While a nuclear weapon cannot improve or replicate itself, or resist being shut down, a superintelligent AI system could, in principle, do all three. We are therefore contemplating a technology that could out-think experts and potentially subvert even our most capable national security apparatus. This is not science fiction. We have recently seen a leading AI company...
The National Security Act already recognises that new technologies create significant vectors for attack. This amendment simply applies that existing logic to the most advanced AI systems now in development, ensuring that state-backed proxies cannot use autonomous code to achieve what once required human hired guns.
Our world is being remade, and the front line is no longer somewhere distant or abstract-it is here. It is embedded across our infrastructure, our institutions and our daily lives. If we fail to act now, we risk confronting a crisis at a point when control has already slipped beyond our grasp. This amendment is not about alarmism; it is about preparedness. It ensures that we recognise this emerging category of threat before it materialises, not after. We must write the rules before the systems outgrow them.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for the amendments in their names. It is timely to have a debate and to keep raising-as I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, does regularly-the threat we face from China. The ISC in its China report outlined the very detailed structure which the Chinese state, which has the largest security services in the world, uses not just at home for repression but abroad for undermining other nations’ ability to act, and in persecuting individuals who oppose the Chinese communist regime. The issue around the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office is an obvious one which has raised concerns. The Bill is needed because whenever we have made the operating environment more difficult for states to use diplomatic cover, they have gone to other lengths. The success in identifying individuals who are using diplomatic cover for other activities shows that our security services are conscious of this. The response to the Salisbury attacks-in this country and across Europe among our allies, where a number of individuals were expelled from Russian embassies because of their links to intelligence services and activities which were not in keeping with their designation under the Vienna convention-certainly proved that point. The problem I have with Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is in defining strategy. That would be very difficult in terms of the united front. We all know what our adversaries get up to and what...
My Lords, I was pleased to co-sign the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. All the amendments in this group-Amendments 1, 3 and 4 in particular-are expressing frustration with the limited scope of the Bill. Perhaps the Minister might be able to give an idea as to whether the national security Bill that was heralded in the King’s Speech will be able to pick up some of these themes, if we are not successful in persuading the Government today to make amendments to this state threats Bill. There is a feeling of concern that some threats that have been experienced, or that are pretty obvious, are not being sufficiently dealt with by the Government. This is particularly in relation to China, where we have been urged to wake up and not be naive about the underwater crocodile. Whether the Government are being naive or shaped by other considerations towards China, there is a feeling that there appears to be so much going on-demonstrated in the recent trial concerning the staff of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and otherwise instanced by the transnational repression towards residents of this country from Hong Kong who are being persecuted by the Chinese state, while they are supposedly under the protection of this country and this Government, which is intolerable-that we need to wake up and smell the coffee in relation to China. I would like to hear some reassurances from the Minister that if he cannot take up some of these points in this Bill, the...
I strongly agree with the points that the noble Baroness has just been making. She has referenced the plight of people living in the United Kingdom who now have bounties on their heads. Will she take the opportunity to highlight specifically the case of Chloe Cheung, who was 14 when she took part in pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and now has a 1 million Hong Kong dollar bounty on her head and is fearful of being dragged in-as some were, and attempts were made to drag others, to the Chinese consulate in Manchester in order to intimidate them? These are not illusions. There are many frightened Hong Kongers in the UK worried about the direct attacks that are being made upon them. I thank the noble Baroness for raising the general point.
Not at all. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for all the work that he has done on this topic, both individually and as chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I had the pleasure of meeting Chloe Cheung and some of her colleagues, and became even more aware of the threats they are under. It is intolerable that people to whom we have rightly given protection and residence are facing these kinds of huge, life-threatening threats from a foreign state. So far, we are not feeling reassured that this Bill is going to cover these threats. There is a feeling among many of us that we want to hear robust pledges from the Government, even if, for whatever reason, they now want to get the Bill through incredibly quickly, having-to the bemusement of some of us-taken over a year to get to the point. They now want to rush it all through, but so be it. There is unfinished business in the Bill. If it is not dealt with today, it needs to be dealt with as soon as possible in the forthcoming national security Bill: the transnational repression, the proxy networks, the issues with the capacity of our police forces to cope with these threats, the foreign language capacity, the resources, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, called it, the “China capability”. We risk being looked at as a laughing stock if our state and its law enforcement institutions are not able to cope with the threat being directed towards our state and the people living here. So I hope that, even if the Minister does...
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee
My Lords, I do not want to delay the House for very long. I will just add my voice to Amendment 1, which I added my name to. The Government are very clearly warning about hostile state activity. Therefore, the probing amendment gives the Government and the Minister the opportunity to say that espionage is included in the state threat. The amendment seeks to add it and to give clarity to the clause. However, I hope that the Minister can be very clear that the foreign power threat activity includes espionage. If he is able to say that, it will be very helpful. It is very clear, after the recent case involving the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office-which, as far as I am concerned, should no longer have any status here in London and should be disbanded, but that is for another day-that the British state was penetrated, dissidents have been targeted and, indeed, our colleagues in Parliament have been under surveillance. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be able to say that in his closing remarks.
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in group 1 in the name of various noble Lords, including, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. I say “of course” in tribute to the noble Lord’s indefatigable illumination of the threat posed to this country by the odious Chinese Communist Party regime. I join with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, in thanking him for his enduring efforts to ensure that we are alive to the CCP’s deliberate, cynical and relentless attempts to undermine our democracy and the West as a whole.
In relation specifically to Amendment 1, espionage is central to the attempt to undermine us, whether it is to enable transnational repression of Hong Kong dissidents in the UK and elsewhere, as we have just heard, to misrepresent and thereby minimise public awareness of the CCP regime’s genocide against the Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang province, or simply for military and commercial gain. One could argue that all states, even allies, engage in a degree of espionage. The difference is that few embark on it with the same aggressive, menacing and malign intent as the CCP.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and other noble Lords, mentioned the recent case involving the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office. I agree that it is clearly a front for nefarious activity against the interests of the UK and its citizens. Its raison d’être is clearly no longer justified, given that the CCP regime has brutally quashed any vestige of Hong Kong as a separate entity. It is not: it has been swallowed up, and with it its reasons. There is no justification for an outdated institution whose true purpose was on full display recently at the Old Bailey to be allowed to remain. The fact that successive Governments have continued to mouth the mantra that the HKETO is about trade merely serves to underline the urgent case for the amendments in this group.
We must call out the CCP and show that we recognise, as my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, said, that we are dealing with adversaries. To fail to do so is to passively perpetuate their lies and signal that we are content to acquiesce in their defeat of us. We can and should, through these amendments, signal our self-confidence, our fervent belief in the democratic system and our renewed determination to export it, so that one day the Chinese people themselves may taste the freedoms that we take for granted in the West.
Just because we cannot bring ourselves to accept that China is our enemy does not change the fact that China, Russia and Iran view us as exactly that and act accordingly. Taken together, the amendments in this group take the fight to our enemies, including non-state actors and media organs. These amendments strengthen the Bill by optimising its effect and, crucially, its message. Surely, at a time when the credibility of the free world has rarely been so undermined by its own leader in the White House, demonstrating to our enemies and our friends that we are determined to be on the front foot in addressing both state and non-state threats has never mattered more. That is why the amendments in this group deserve our support.
My Lords, I will remark briefly on the excellent intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and others, on the sleeping crocodile and toothbrushes. I ask the Minister to say, in summing up, why it is so very difficult for the UK Government to be extremely firm with China on the issues we are discussing today, which involve vast trampling on international norms and human rights. China itself has made it clear that if it wishes to continue trade with the UK, it will do so. China acts in its own best interests. No matter how firm we are on other issues, if it is in China’s interest to trade in toothbrushes or whatever, it will continue to do so. I do not understand why the Government are so reluctant to build and publish a strategy that is extremely and overtly firm regarding the kind of transgressions we are discussing throughout this Bill.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I regret that I was unable to take part on Second Reading owing to a long-standing family commitment, but I am very grateful on behalf of both the Liberal Democrats and many others for the Minister’s engagement with us before Second Reading and since. It has been extremely helpful, and his Bill team have been extremely helpful. The fact that most of the issues we face are now resolved owes a great deal to that commitment. As was made clear at Second Reading, we support the aim of the Bill, in the light of the advice given to the Government by Jonathan Hall KC that further legislation is needed to enable appropriate action to respond to damaging activity by foreign state actors, as opposed to private bodies, that is prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s security and national interests. We also understand the urgency of the Bill and the reason why it has been taken, effectively, as emergency legislation. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that the degree of hurry and the haste overall have, sadly, reduced the amount of scrutiny we have been able to give it. The speed does not obviate the need for Parliament, and this House in particular, to give the Bill as much scrutiny as it can in the limited time available. But we do so in the light of the Government’s commitment, given in the King’s Speech, and to which my noble friend Lady Ludford referred, to introduce legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies and to...
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. We all agree that the Bill is needed. As we said at Second Reading, the Opposition support the principles behind the Bill and the creation of a designation regime to tackle state threats, most importantly the IRGC. We do, however, feel the need to again make criticisms of how we have reached this point. When the Government introduced the Bill three weeks ago, the usual channels agreed to fast-track it in both Houses. Part of that agreement was that the Government would work with the Opposition in a constructive manner to ensure that the Bill is the best it can be. My honourable friend Alicia Kearns MP had meetings with officials in the Home Office, informing them of her concerns about gaps in the Bill. My noble friend Lord Davies of Gower sent to the Minister two letters confirming those concerns, the first on 10 June and the second on 17 June. We gave the Government as much advance notice as possible of the amendments we would table, to give them enough time to consider the proposals and reach a reasonable compromise.
We did all this in good faith, but unfortunately our willingness to act constructively has not been reciprocated. The Government have failed to take on board our concerns around certain issues, even points that were recommended by Jonathan Hall KC. Their stock line has been to say that they do not have enough time to make changes to the Bill, given its progress. In that regard, I echo the points made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. The Government have had more than a year since Jonathan Hall KC published his report recommending a new proscription-like power for state-linked bodies. They have had months since we pushed our amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill to proscribe the IRGC. They have had several weeks now to draft amendments that address those gaps in the Bill. It is highly regrettable that on an issue as important as this, national security, the Government have shown themselves to be wholly unwilling to accept that there are serious gaps, gaps that will be exploited by the very groups that we are seeking to target with this legislation. I wish to put on record our profound disappointment with the way the Government have acted over this Bill. It is very regrettable indeed.
Turning to some of the amendments in this group, I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has tabled Amendment 3, which specifies different categories of conduct that would be considered by the Home Secretary when making a decision on which bodies to designate. This amendment was tabled in the other place by my honourable friend Alicia Kearns because, as she noted, there is no recognition of transnational repression in British law. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has repeatedly highlighted in your Lordships’ House, transnational repression takes many different forms and is perpetrated by the Chinese Communist Party, the IRGC, the Kremlin and others. China claims international jurisdiction for its national security laws, meaning agents of the Chinese state operate across the world in their attempts to kidnap so-called dissidents. The noble Lord’s Amendment 3 rightly highlights these issues, and we support it.
In Amendment 2, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has rightly identified how hostile states use media propaganda to spread their influence. We have tabled an amendment criminalising the dissemination of publications related to designated bodies which will be debated in a later group, so we will reserve our comments on this matter for then. Suffice to say that, for now, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, that this is a significant lacuna in the Bill and the Government must rectify it.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions and comments and for the broad support for the Bill from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. I shall start on the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron has raised. This Bill is a result of a Labour manifesto commitment. It is a result of a commission we gave to Jonathan Hall KC to examine these areas in October 2024. He produced a report for the Government which they have examined in detail, and they have given commitments in this House to bring forward legislation at the earliest opportunity. This is the earliest opportunity. In giving time for discussions with the Official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats, the Cross Benches and noble Lords such as the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Anderson and others, I have tried to make sure that we get this Bill right. It has had a fast track, agreed with the Opposition. It was put through the House of Commons in one day. We agreed to have Second Reading in one day and now all remaining stages of the Bill today. I have tried to support the Opposition to achieve their objectives. I have to say to the noble Lord that I have been very clear, open and honest in private conversations about what I can do and what I cannot do. What I have said to him I can do I have tried to do. As we shall see in later amendments, the Government have tried to assist other noble Lords. I have also been very clear about what I cannot do. What I...
Just before the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, leaves that point-and he will know that I have raised this before-it was one of the points raised in the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, which identified China as the principal threat when it comes to transnational repression, more than any other state. We puzzled over why, therefore, Iran and Russia are in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, but China is not. I know that the Minister will say, “We continue to look at this”, but will he give us some idea of how long it will take before we get a real answer to that question?
I am afraid the noble Lord will have to accept the answer I give him every time he raises this issue, which is that we keep these matters under review. If the Home Secretary believes that the power should be exercised, she will exercise it alongside the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers. I cannot give him the answer to that question now, for the reasons he knows. I hope he understands that. The noble Lord’s Amendment 3 proposes new types of conduct to be treated as foreign power activity. As I understand it, this would supplement but not supplant the existing meaning of Section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 when making designations. I am entirely sympathetic to the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, of making the UK a harder target for transnational repression. He will know it is a matter the Government take seriously and that we continue to make concrete progress, including on the helpful recommendations from the noble Lord’s own committee, the JCHR, and the detailed inquiry. This includes the continued implementation of the National Security Act 2023, the recent successful prosecutions I referred to a moment ago, the introduction of police training, practical guidance, a national protective security agency and a range of other matters. Where a person carries out such activity with the intention of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service, it would already fall within the scope of foreign power threat activity. I think that is right and that the link...
I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. As he said, it puts it beyond doubt. It would enable that to be referred to in a court of law, should such a prosecution occur. I regard that as very significant progress, and I am grateful to the Minister.
I am grateful for that welcome from the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I will touch on Amendment 5, from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, who-again contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has said- I have tried to engage with a number of times this week, including, at short notice, in discussions across the board. I am trying my best to achieve those objectives. Amendment 5 seeks to expand the scope of the preparatory conduct offence and the definition of foreign threat activity to incorporate the development of artificial superintelligence. The noble Baroness has a strong point. She is right to identify the risks posed by advanced AI models. As the picture is rapidly evolving, it is vital that the Government step up to this challenge, and we are already trying to do so. We have the AI Security Institute, the most advanced capability of any Government in the world for understanding AI. The National Cyber Security Centre, part of GCHQ, is providing world-leading defensive capabilities. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which is currently progressing through Parliament, will strengthen protections, and we are shortly to produce a national cyber action plan setting out the steps that the Government want to take. However, I recognise that the noble Baroness has made important points, and I will go as far as I can to reassure her on those issues. The Government recognise that the development by foreign powers of highly advanced artificial intelligence systems...
I apologise for interrupting the Minister in full flow. Can he make the position absolutely clear? He said that, as far as the Government are concerned, on the advice that they have received, Amendment 3 is covered by Section 33 of the 2023 Act. He has put that plainly on the record. Is he also saying that, as far as the Government are concerned, Amendment 5 is covered by Section 18 of the 2023 Act but, if that is not the case and the independent reviewer makes cogent recommendations, the Government will come ready to this House to amend Section 18 of the 2023 Act as necessary? The one thing to remember in the context of the independent reviewer is that the independent reviewer can only tell the Government what he thinks. He cannot amend the law himself. That assurance would be very helpful.
I happily give the noble Lord the assurance that, as I have said, we are trying to ensure that we ask the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to expressly consider whether amendments to the legislation, as in the area noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, are considered. That will be a formal request, involving the independent reviewer making a judgment about who he wishes to call, and that would undoubtedly include, as suggested by the noble Baroness, independent AI experts. My noble friend Lord Beamish, the chair of the ISC, is in the Chamber today and will have heard what has been said. He has had the discussion and the offer has been made to all parties that they at least submit some evidence as part of that process. I go back to the genesis of the Bill. The Bill is around because there was a manifesto commitment. There was a request to the independent reviewer and he has come up with suggestions. We have introduced the Bill as part of those suggestions, and we have said in response to other areas that His Majesty’s Opposition have pressed us on that we will consider those matters, but we have to do so as part of other, wider Bills. I am saying to the Committee today that this is a defined Bill with a defined purpose. I am trying to ensure that, having listened to the Committee, and as we will discuss in later amendments-
My Lords-
I will finish this sentence, if I may. As we will discuss in later amendments, we have made some changes to help reflect some of the views that have been put to me. Ultimately, that is the position that I am trying to take.
May I repeat my second question? Will the Minister confirm that it is the Government’s view that Amendment 5 is covered already by Section 18 of the National Security Act 2023?
My view is that there are powers there. However, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I am saying that we will ask the independent reviewer to examine whether we need to make any changes. That is the settlement I am trying to reach today. If there are other points I want to add to that, I will contact the noble Lord by letter or email afterwards. That is the settlement I am trying to put on the record for all parties today, to get this aspect of the Bill agreed and the amendments not pressed.
The urgency of dealing with the question of AI was emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and, of course, by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to whose excellent amendment I am a signatory. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is about to complete a further investigation into AI and human rights. I hope that, along with all the other referrals the Minister is going to make to the independent commissioner, he might ensure that the findings of that Joint Committee, which we anticipate will be published before the Summer Recess, will also be drawn to his attention.
The noble Lord knows that I always welcome the views of the committee, and I will look at them and reflect on them with colleagues. I can probably give a definitive yes to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on his point; I was hedging my bets, but I think I can give a definitive yes. I hope that helps him in his assessment. I always like to give the House exquisite legal advice on these matters, rather than finding myself having to examine my own comments at a later date. I hope again that, given all the points that have been made, my noble friend will withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not push theirs. The Committee will notice that I have not spoken to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, or indeed the clause stand part notice from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which were in this group, because they have not spoken to them. With that, I hope that my noble friend will respond accordingly.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
I first thank the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Beamish and Lord Shinkwin, for their support. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who managed to get Jimmy Lai’s name in, which we always appreciate. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his assurance that espionage is covered. This is a live issue. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, John Lee, has said that overseas activists with bounties on their heads will be “pursued for life”. Activists such as Christopher Mung, Ted Hui, Finn Lau and Nathan Law have all been targeted by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, so what we are asking for is urgent. That is why I support this Bill going as fast as possible and being implemented as quick as possible. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 1 withdrawn.
Amendments 2 and 3 not moved.
Clause 1 agreed.
Amendments 4 and 5 not moved.
Clause 2: Offences relating to designated bodies
Amendments 6 to 8 not moved.
Amendment 9
Moved by
9: Clause 2, page 4, line 23, at end insert- “(3A) The conduct specified in subsection (3) includes establishing, administering or maintaining a company, trust, partnership or similar arrangement which conceals, or is intended to conceal, the beneficial ownership of assets connected with a designated body.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment makes the concealment of beneficial ownership, and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets relating to a designated organisation, an offence.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
That moved a little faster than I had anticipated, so I now have to move my finger a little faster. Amendment 9, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Northover, reflects one that was moved in the House of Commons by my honourable friend Steff Aquarone, the Member for North Norfolk. The amendment would include in the offence of assisting a designated body the conduct of establishing or administering a company, trust or partnership, or another body, with the aim of disguising “the beneficial ownership of assets” controlled by such a body. The amendment is designed to advance transparency and to penalise the exercise of disguising the real ownership of the assets of bodies designated under this legislation, so that what is sometimes called corporate disguise cannot be used to assist unlawful foreign power threat activity by a designated body, and it would do so by making it an offence under new Section 17B. As my honourable friend Mr Aquarone put it succinctly in the House of Commons: “These groups rely on hiding their money, and opaque financial systems only help them to do that ”.-[ Official Report , Commons, 17/6/26; col. 931.] By extending liability to those who make that opacity possible, we limit the ability of designated groups to continue to benefit from their assets and finances. The Government’s position appears to be, or appeared in the House of Commons to be, that existing mechanisms of financial control are sufficient protection of our national security from...
Under this legislation, conduct assisting a designated body is to be a very serious criminal offence, attracting very serious sentences of imprisonment. I am unclear why existing transparency and reporting regimes should not be bolstered by the specific inclusion in this legislation of “assisting in disguising the assets of designated bodies”, and that conduct being designated and criminalised under the Bill. I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister could give the Committee a further and more detailed explanation of why that should not be the case, and if he would at least promise to give further consideration to specifically including such conduct as assisting a designated body by hiding assets when this is further reviewed in the legislation promised in the King’s Speech, which he has confirmed is forthcoming. I beg to move.
My Lords, I speak briefly in support of my noble friend Lord Marks. He has put the case extremely effectively, taking from the amendment tabled by my honourable friend in the other place. Generally speaking, this is an area where there has been much cross-party working by the right honourable Andrew Mitchell, the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge, my noble friend Lady Kramer, and others. I therefore hope that noble Lords will be helpful in responding to this. The Panama papers, and many other sources, have revealed much information that would already have been in the public domain had beneficial ownership been clearer. Therefore, I hope the Minister will join me in supporting this amendment.
My Lords, the amendments in this group concern offences relating to the support and assistance of designated bodies. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, has not spoken to his amendments. In this regard, it is worth commenting that these Benches have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind the noble Lord’s amendments-he spoke at Second Reading last week-namely, the fact that a designated body, as a media organ, should not be a potential avenue by which criminals avoid prosecution. It is an issue worthy of consideration. It would be interesting if the Minister could confirm whether the offences proposed by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would already be captured by the Bill as drafted. Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make it an offence to conceal beneficial ownership relating to a designated organisation. Again, we on these Benches support the principle behind this amendment. The use, funnelling or concealment of funds to support a designated body should undoubtedly be an offence that is captured by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister can provide assurances that this will be the case. I look forward to his response.
I am grateful for the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place, but his amendments have been referred to. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that the conduct captured in the amendments is already appropriately provided for by the existing provisions in the Bill. Had the noble Lord, Lord Walney, spoken to them, I would have gone into more detail, but that is the principle of the response to date. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his Amendment 9, which intends to specify the concealment of beneficial ownership, and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets related to a designated body, as material assistance. The Government take corruption in all its forms very seriously. We welcome the noble Lord’s focus on this important issue, and the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined. On the noble Lord’s concerns about beneficial ownership, the Government have a strong record on reducing illicit finance, including working with overseas territories and Crown dependencies to do so. The register of overseas entities requires overseas entities that own UK property to register verified information on their beneficial owners with Companies House and to update that information. The Government also produce an annual progress report to...
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I am very grateful for the assurances and explanations that the Minister has given. I will not press the amendment to a vote now, but I invite him to consider, between now and the introduction of further legislation, whether there is a complete overlap, so that anybody who helps the disguise of assets, perhaps without knowing that the designated body is the beneficiary of that assistance, will be covered by the offence as it stands, because it seems to me that there is a possible lacuna where new legislation would be helpful. If he would add to his assurance by saying that he will at least consider whether there is such a gap, I would be happier in withdrawing my amendment, which I will seek leave to do in any event. I give him an opportunity to respond to that very specific point.
I give the noble Lord the assurance that we will certainly look at those matters, and I will include that in the correspondence that I send him post the consideration of the Bill.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I am very grateful and, with that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 9 withdrawn.
Amendment 10 not moved.
Amendment 11
Moved by
11: Clause 2, page 4, line 34, at end insert- “(5A) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to conduct engaged in on behalf of an impartial humanitarian organisation that is necessary to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would create an exemption from the offence in section 17B of assisting a designated body if the assistance is provided on behalf of an impartial humanitarian organisation.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 11, I will speak also to Amendment 12A, which replaces my original Amendment 12; Amendment 13A, which replaces my original Amendment 13; Amendment 18A, which replaces Amendment 18; Amendment 19A, which replaces Amendment 19; and Amendment 16. I want to start by acknowledging the huge amount of support and effort that others have put into getting us to where we are now: the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, with his expertise and understanding, Sarah Champion and those associated with the International Development Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross, other leading NGOs and others, and, from Friday onwards, the Minister and his team. I think that the poor Minister is probably due a full night’s sleep after all this. I sympathise with the Government and those who drafted this legislation. I understand why they want to act, but we all know, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, pointed out, that acting in haste in drafting legislation can have predictable challenges. For me, therefore, the key is to address the unintended consequences of this short Bill, rather than to seek to move particular areas forward. That will need to wait for the longer Bill that we have been promised in the King’s Speech. It could never be acceptable to say that this legislation must go through unamended, when risks were perceived with it, because we were short of time. I also note the engagement of Jonathan Hall KC, who published a note on receipt of information on...
Amendments 18A and 19A provide a defence-again-to those carrying out humanitarian activities. It has been said to me that, if there was any protection for humanitarian organisations in the Bill, malign actors might exploit this. But I point out that the UK has previously shown global leadership in its efforts to safeguard humanitarian action round the world. This includes a range of exceptions and general licences to protect humanitarian activities from sanctions, including counterterrorism sanctions. The UK has acted at the UN on this a number of times. There are also protections through the FCDO in terms of examination of partners and the examination under UK law of UK charities.
This is not a new challenge, and ways of addressing this have been found. I was therefore extremely grateful for the engagement of the Minister and his team. I hope, therefore, that we might agree that those carrying out humanitarian activities should have a defence in the Bill, even if we cannot carve out my preference of an exemption. I also thank the Minister’s team for suggesting that I should broaden my definition of “humanitarian aid” to make it “humanitarian activities”. I thank them for that suggestion; I have adopted it in my amendments, and I agree that is far preferable.
We are seeking to work together so that we can better protect the UK and its citizens, while at the same time not criminalising those extremely brave humanitarian organisations which may find themselves needing to deal with some of the most brutal people in the world as they seek to help the most vulnerable. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and I am delighted to add my support to Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A in her name. The unintended application of the new Sections 17B and 17C to those who carry out humanitarian activities was a danger to which we both spoke at Second Reading, and these amendments go a very long way to laying those concerns to rest. My own Amendment 17, signed also by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who is not in his place, has similarly been superseded by Amendment 17A, which I tabled yesterday after discussion with the Minister. It appears in the supplementary list and is accompanied by the minor and consequential manuscript Amendment 18B. Amendment 17A was floated in the Second Reading speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, last Tuesday, tweaked in the note produced by Jonathan Hall KC on Thursday and tabled by me later that day. Three Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation might not be quite as entertaining as the Three Tenors, but we have, I hope, as so often, sung more or less in harmony. The problem that Amendment 17A seeks to address is the breadth of Section 17C, which prohibits obtaining material benefits from a designated body. Section 17C(3) defines material benefits as including not only “anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit”, but additionally, and separately, the unqualified word “information”. The Minister...
I realise that it is unusual to speak this early in the debate, but I just hope the House will bear with me for a second. I believe it is important to give a view on the two sets of amendments that have been moved, so that colleagues will understand where the Government are coming from in any contributions they wish to make. I recognise the concern raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about inadvertently criminalising the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and the resulting chilling effect this could have on important work. We have listened to the concerns and we have had extensive discussion outside the Committee. The Government will accept a new defence into Sections 17B and 17C, which is manifested by Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A, where conduct is carried out for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities, which are defined as only those activities carried out in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards. I am also grateful again for Amendment 17A from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which is based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC, to expand the defence of “reasonable excuse” to cover obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This pragmatic proposal will mean that, where a legitimate humanitarian organisation, such as those mentioned by the noble Lord, or a charity involved in conflict resolution, or indeed a...
My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification. It makes things much easier and will shorten the debate. The point that I was going to make, in respect of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, is that designated bodies are different from terrorist organisations, because they may be exercising public functions in certain countries. For that reason, there are a number of British nationals who will have to engage with the designated bodies for perfectly legitimate reasons. Most of the examples that we have dealt with concern precisely that scenario: that is, cases of British nationals providing humanitarian assistance, journalists or those involved in conflict resolution. But we should not lose sight of the possibility that even businesses could find themselves caught by these offences but for the reasonable excuse defence, which has now been accepted. There may, for example, be British businesses operating in Iran for perfectly legitimate reasons that will have to sell an investment and will have to obtain information from a designated body as part of that process. There may be British-Iranian dual nationals who have to, in the same way, accept or obtain information because they have to renew a passport or such other things. The reasonable defence excuse, which has now been cast in sufficiently wide terms, captures those situations. I am a little bit unclear about Section 17B, but the Section 17B offence concerns me a bit less because it already...
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 22 in the group in my name and the name of my noble friend Lady D’Souza. It touches on the issues that my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich raised in his remarks. I am very pleased with the progress that we have made around humanitarian organisations. During the Second Reading debate last week, I specifically referred to the position of the International Committee of the Red Cross and said that it would passing strange if the united desire of this House to designate organisations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could be used to impede the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross. I specifically referred to an amendment to the Bill which it asked should be moved. I tabled it in due course and it is on the Order Paper. During our very helpful meeting yesterday, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, responded to another point that I raised with him and that I had also raised in correspondence with my noble friend Lord Anderson over the weekend concerning the position of journalists. I was struck by representations made by the admirable Alex Crawford from Sky News, who had given evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights during our inquiry into the activities of ISIS. The noble Lord will recall that I have raised with him the failure to prosecute any of the 400 ISIS members who committed genocide against Yazidis in northern Iraq and northern Syria and who have returned to this country. Not one of them has...
My Lords, I think the noble Lord means the International Committee of the Red Cross.
I do indeed-there are too many acronyms flying around at the moment, and it is rather late in the day. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness.
This is an international organisation of very high standing for which all of us have great admiration. I hope that this will be put beyond doubt, because on its behalf people have put in cogent terms that some of its work could have been compromised in the Bill as it was drafted. I recognise that my noble friend Lord Anderson has helped us to make progress on this. Perhaps when the Minister replies, he will say how this will now be dealt with. These amendments presumably will now have to be sent back to another place. Is he satisfied that this will meet his objective of moving to Royal Assent very rapidly? He knows that none of us wishes to place obstacles in the progress of the Bill but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, has said, we do not want this to become a law of unintended consequences.
My Lords, as a Welsh-born bathroom singer of much practice, I was pleased with my noble friend Lord Anderson when he referred to three tenors. However, your Lordships will have observed that, with the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and his operatic roots, it is now four tenors-and an “alto” as well.
Noble Lords
Oh!
It took your Lordships quite a long time to get that one. But seriously, I commend and congratulate my noble friend Lord Anderson and the Minister for the hard work they have done together in the last couple of days. I was attending a wonderful family wedding in Hereford Cathedral yesterday and was being informed, between bits of the service, of what was happening in the discussions. I am very happy with the result. What has been agreed gives sufficient protection for the concerns that have been expressed. I mentioned at Second Reading my belief that the discretion vested in the DPP and the Attorney-General is a real protection and would be a real protection for those who might be faced with even a suspicion of prosecution in such a case. I think that we have reached a good way to deal with the matters raised by my noble friend Lord Anderson at Second Reading.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is vital to our national security that those who assist bodies designated under this Bill are appropriately and effectively punished. The Terrorism Act 2000 has no prohibited purpose condition analogous to that included in the Bill, which we on these Benches believe could be exploited by potential criminals. As my noble friend Lord Cameron and I argued at Second Reading, the existence of a prohibited purpose requirement will add a large degree of subjectivity and present further evidential barriers for prosecutors in the majority of cases where offenders have no legitimate defence. This argument was also made by Conservative MPs in the other place. We were told, however, by the Government that they were unable to accept our amendment, that no amendments to this Bill would be accepted and that our only chance of engaging in meaningful dialogue was to wait until the next national security Bill, the date for which is unspecified. It is in that context that I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A seek to create a defence for the offences of assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefit from a designated body. I understand the principle behind these amendments. However, we on these Benches worry that “for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities” is a potentially subjective...
For the avoidance of doubt, I quite like the noble Lord, and we have a good relationship on these matters. I think I have constructive discussions on these matters with both noble Lords opposite. But I want to say to the House that I have been very clear to the noble Lord from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition that there are certain things we can do and there are certain things we cannot. There are some issues we agree with, but not in this Bill, and there are other measures we will return to in future legislation. I have tried to not dilute the central purpose of this Bill, which is to give the Home Secretary a power to designate anybody that she, having taken advice from a range of sources in the Home Office and through agencies, thinks is a threat to the state. As I have said, the issues the noble Lord has tried to shoehorn into the Bill are ones the Government in part agree with, and we will find a proper mechanism to implement those policies in due course. I did not want to extend the scope of the Bill, nor did I want to put in measures that, in my view, dilute its core purpose. That is why I have not been able to help the noble Lord. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover-and indeed the Liberal Democrat Front Bench-made points about the unintended consequence of humanitarian, journalistic or other agencies being caught. I have tried, privately and at Second Reading, to give assurances that the Bill as drafted would not lead to...
I am grateful to the Minister. It is important that we focus on the matter in hand, what the Government are seeking to do, making sure there are no unintended consequences and taking this forward. I hear the concern from the Conservative Front Bench, but I hope that they are able to see the bigger picture of what this was about and what we were seeking to do, which was not party-political in any way. It was simply to try to remedy some defects that we saw. We are grateful that the Government were able to hear that. It was something that was echoed by a number of organisations and lots of experts helping us in this regard. I am glad that in the end that was heard and therefore we have a better, safer Bill without those defects. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 11 withdrawn.
Amendment 12 not moved.
Amendment 12A
Moved by
12A: Clause 2, page 5, line 7, at end insert- “(e) for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17B prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Amendment 12A agreed.
Amendment 13 not moved.
Amendment 13A
Moved by
13A: Clause 2, page 5, line 12, at end insert- “(7A) For the purposes of subsection (6)(e), the reference to the carrying out of humanitarian activities does not include the carrying out of humanitarian activities in contravention of internationally recognised principles and standards applicable to the carrying out of humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17B prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Amendment 13A agreed.
Amendments 14 to 17 not moved.
Amendment 17A
Moved by
17A: Clause 2, page 6, line 23, at end insert- “(7A) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) or (2) where-(a) the benefit consists of, or includes, information, and(b) the conduct in question relates to that information,it is a defence to show that the person had a reasonable excuse for that conduct.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would create a reasonable excuse defence for obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from or on behalf of a designated body.
Amendment 17A agreed.
Amendment 18 not moved.
Amendment 18A
Moved by
18A: Clause 2, page 6, line 35, at end insert- “(d) for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17C prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Amendment 18A agreed.
Amendment 18B
Moved by
18B: Clause 2, page 6, line 37, after “(7)” insert “, (7A)” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on another amendment in Lord Anderson of Ipswich’s name.
Amendment 18B agreed.
Amendment 19 not moved.
Amendment 19A
Moved by
19A: Clause 2, page 6, line 40, at end insert- “(9A) For the purposes of subsection (8)(d), the reference to the carrying out of humanitarian activities does not include the carrying out of humanitarian activities in contravention of internationally recognised principles and standards applicable to the carrying out of humanitarian activities.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, together with others in the name of Baroness Northover, provides a defence to the section 17C prohibition for the provision of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.
Amendment 19A agreed.
Amendment 20
Moved by
20: Clause 2, page 7, line 8, at end insert- “17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if the person-(a) wears an item of clothing, or(b) wears, carries or displays an article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of-(a) an item of clothing, or(b) any other article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable- (a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.(7) The powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to...
My Lords, I have already made it clear that the way the Government have dealt with this Bill is unfortunate, so I will not dwell on that any longer. The amendments in this group reflect the concerns that the Opposition have raised with the Government on a number of occasions. The Government have told us that they cannot accept any of them for myriad reasons. As I hope I will demonstrate to the Committee, every one of the Government’s arguments will fail at the first hint of scrutiny. Amendment 20 would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body. This would include those who publish an image of such articles. This amendment seeks to correct the strange situation that could arise under this Bill whereby a state entity may be designated, but it would not be an offence to display its insignia or to glorify it online.
I am a little concerned by what is meant by an article of clothing. My noble friend will know that the keffiyeh is widely worn on the streets of London and was much associated, when worn by Yasser Arafat, with the PLO. Is there a risk that the wearing of the keffiyeh would be associated with support for a designated body? If there is, we are in very serious trouble.
I am not well-acquainted with this article of clothing.
It is an Arab headdress.
Should it come before a court, the court would have to decide. Further than that I cannot comment, but I take on board what the noble Lord says. Getting back to what I was saying, such provisions already exist for proscribed organisations under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. Where the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. Hordes of its supporters could wave IRGC flags on British streets and intimidate members of the Jewish community, and avoid any legal ramifications. This is an obvious legislative gap that is damaging to public confidence. At Second Reading, the Minister said that banning uniforms would impact legitimate engagement of the designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. I do not buy that argument. We are not legislating for Iran in this Bill; we are legislating for the United Kingdom. The offences do not apply to non-UK persons outside the United Kingdom. My amendments would not criminalise the display of IRGC insignia in Tehran. They would criminalise such acts only in Britain. I contend that, if, for some reason, an Iranian diplomat came to the country for diplomatic negotiations-although I do not believe that that has happened since 1980-it would be perfectly acceptable to require them not to wear an IRGC uniform or insignia. If noble Lords are not convinced by my arguments then perhaps the following words will help put...
The then Labour Government recognised that a specific stand-alone offence of dissemination was needed to address the fact that the dissemination of terrorist publications was not covered by the offence of inviting support in the Terrorist Act 2000. I hope the Minister can confirm that this Labour Government will take the same sensible steps that their predecessors took, and I look forward to what he has to say. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have added my name in support of Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. As he has explained, Amendment 20 would create an offence mirroring an existing offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under that section, it is already an offence for a person to wear an item of clothing in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that that person is a supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. So we already have that offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act in respect of proscribed terrorism organisations; but, unless Amendment 20 is adopted, there will be no similar offence for someone wearing a uniform or displaying the insignia of a designated body. I agree with those who have said a number of times that state threats call for a different response in some respects from that which we adopt in respect of terrorist organisations, but I do not see why, in respect of this particular offence, a different approach is needed. With this Bill we are trying to protect our public spaces-our public sphere, really-from the influence of malign foreign state organisations and from their attempts to subvert our democratic values and our liberal principles. The Bill criminalises supporting a designated body but, as the Minister has explained before, it does so on a basis that is more demanding than for the corresponding offence under the Terrorism Act, so it would be challenging to rely on the offence of...
My Lords, I too have added my name in support of Amendment 20 and endorse everything my noble friend Lord Verdirame has just said. I will briefly add, for emphasis, that the Government have promised an equivalent power for state-related organisations and without this, one of the key planks would not have an equivalent power. Finally, if I understood correctly the concern expressed about the keffiyeh at the beginning of speech of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that not an article of clothing now commonly associated with a fully proscribed terrorist organisation, Hamas? As has been said, if such legal jeopardy arose, the relevant law does exist-Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. It is not widely used, and the argument would probably be that this headdress was originally about the assertion of Palestinian national identity. It has indeed been co-opted by supporters of Hamas, but it is a separate question which I do not think impinges on whether this amendment ought to be supported.
My Lords, I hesitate to do so, but I disagree with my two noble friends who have just spoken. Some years ago I was in a supermarket in London and found myself standing next to an approximately 17 year-old young man who was wearing a t-shirt with a swastika on it. He was entitled to wear that if he wished, because it is not unlawful to wear a t-shirt with a swastika on it, however much one disapproves. I turned to the young man and, in a moment of complete foolishness, I suppose, said to him, “Excuse me, but do you realise that 6 million people were murdered by the Nazis on the back of that particular insignia?” He turned to me and said, “Sir, I’m most awfully sorry: I never knew that, and I will never wear this again”. I was surprised that I got away with it and lived to tell the tale, as noble Lords will be sure I have on many occasions. I do not think that in this Bill, we should be criminalising the mere wearing of such insignia as I have described. This is not a counterterrorism Bill; this is a counter-state threats Bill. We had this discussion at Second Reading and, in my view at least, we are not merely replicating what is in other Acts of Parliament. Further, if somebody wears an insignia and there is a public order disturbance or a racially aggravated public order disturbance, there are plenty of other laws to deal with that activity. My final reason for objecting to this amendment is one that perhaps some will think trivial. However, if your Lordships were to look...
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, we cannot support these amendments. As we have heard several times, this is emergency legislation, introduced at a time when an urgent response is necessary to the activities of some truly malign state actors and their proxies. There has been a dangerous escalation in recent months and years, not only of the threats of military and quasi-military attacks, but of cyber attacks on our energy and transport infrastructures and on our economy more widely. Then there has been an appalling outbreak of antisemitic attacks in the UK and abroad, and in allied countries such as Australia. Those attacks have also given occasion, we should remember, to anti-Muslim attacks at home and abroad. Our traditions of tolerance and peaceful co-existence have been, and have certainly seemed, constantly under threat. Against that background, it has been considered that the mechanisms of proscription under existing terrorism legislation have needed supplementing with the provisions of this Bill concerning malign state-sponsored threats. As the Minister has confirmed, and I do not wish to be repetitive of what has been said many times in the debates today, there is to be further government legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies, and to improve this country’s defences against cyber security threats. The Bill is, in that sense, work in progress. We do not see the need to tack on to the Bill new offences of wearing items of uniform, dissemination...
My Lords, I normally bow to the views of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on these matters-I am not entirely sure I understand the point he made about split infinitives-but I am not sure he is right on this occasion; nor was the noble Lord who last spoke. The IRGC, for example, is not simply a military arm of the Iranian state. It also operates through propaganda, symbolism, recruitment and ideological influence. While the Bill addresses the hostile state activity, I do not believe it adequately addresses the ideological dimension. Noble Lords have spoken about the level of antisemitism, which has been considerably worsened by the number of marches that we have seen display the symbols, flags and uniforms of terrorist organisations. There should be consistency between “designation” and a “proscribed organisation”. Designation should also have practical consequences. It would be very difficult to explain to members of the public why a designated organisation’s flags, insignia and symbols should continue to be displayed in support of that organisation at marches or on the street. Terrorism legislation already recognises the importance of symbols, uniforms and imagery in demonstrating support. This amendment would close a potential gap in the legislation.
Further, the police should be given some practical powers to act immediately where support of a designated body is being demonstrated. We have already seen so much confusion, but we have been privileged to have the police come and talk to noble Lords. It was pretty obvious, even from things such as “From the river to the sea” and what “jihad” actually means, that we should be giving some practical advice. If the police or the public require a handbook, almost, to explain what “designation” means, then this House has failed. Therefore, the point that my noble friend made is eminently reasonable, and we should pass this amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving the Committee the opportunity to debate these amendments, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for articulating the general position that the Government will take. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for the comments that he made, which mirror some of the points I will make in my response. I completely understand why the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Pickles-who has just spoken-Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, wish to pass these amendments. They make a legitimate argument. The Government are clear in their opposition to all forms of terrorist support, particularly in the current context of antisemitism, and there are key issues that the Government wish to take specific action on. I will say a few words about each of the proposed offences in turn. As has been said, Amendment 20 is modelled on Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which relates to organisations proscribed for being concerned with terrorism. Section 13 has proved to be operationally useful as a strict liability offence, meaning the prosecution does not have to prove an individual’s intention or state of mind. Terrorist organisations seek to recruit others to further their harmful ideologies, and wearing a terrorist uniform or displaying insignia, a flag or a logo are all acts of strength or dominance, if not terror. Section 13 seeks to deny proscribed organisations that oxygen of...
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lord Pickles, for their support, and I thank the Minister for his response. I listened to what the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Carlile of Berriew, had to say about this. However, I remain unconvinced. The very act of wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated body can intimidate members of our society and damage community cohesion. I do not believe that the Bill, as drafted, offers sufficient safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals and communities who are targeted by foreign state powers. If an individual wore an IRGC uniform and sat outside a synagogue, any reasonable member of the public would consider this an intimidatory act. However, the threshold for successful prosecution under a Section 17A offence would remain unacceptably high. The individual could argue that the purpose of wearing the uniform was not to express support for the designated body and that it was worn in a satirical context. Even if this extremely subjective intention could be disproved, it would then fall on the prosecution to show that such actions were prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, which is another subjective and potentially problematic barrier to prosecution. I suggest that my amendment fixes this glaring loophole. It shuts down any avenues through which those who seek to terrorise others can evade prosecution. There are simply no justifications for why someone in the UK should be...
There is absolutely no indication from any potential new Prime Minister that any changes to security legislation will be made. The King’s gracious Speech, and this Bill, both stand.
Amendment 21, as stated previously, would close yet another legislative gap in the Bill, a gap that was recognised 20 years ago and subsequently rectified in the Terrorism Act 2006. I remain unconvinced by the Government’s justification for opposing our amendment. If the Government and Parliament recognised 20 years ago that a specific criminal offence of dissemination was required to address a lacuna in the law in relation to terrorism, surely we must recognise today that it is precisely the same lacuna in this Bill. If my amendments do not form part of the final Act, I fear that the types of propaganda by designated bodies that I mentioned earlier will be allowed to flourish, that the IRGC will be able to parade in its uniforms and with its flags, and that those seeking to travel abroad to assist the IRGC will not be stopped. If any of these things happen, a crucial test of the Bill- namely, its ability to target and disrupt state threats to the United Kingdom-will have failed. The Government have shown that they are not willing to take the necessary action to strengthen the Bill. If that is the case, I am left with no choice but to test the opinion of the House.
Amendments 21 and 22 not moved.
Clause 2 agreed.
Amendment 23 not moved.
Clauses 3 to 8 agreed.
Schedule agreed.
House resumed.
Bill reported with amendments.