National Security (State Threats) Bill
House of Lords · Lords Chamber · 23 Jun 2026 · 35 speeches · Official Report
Second Reading
Moved by
That the Bill be now read a second time.
My Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on what is a vital Bill. I will start with the importance of the Bill and what it will achieve. I am pleased to have had an opportunity to discuss the content, direction and purpose of the Bill with a number of noble Lords outside the Chamber, and I am happy to have further discussions between now and later stages next week if Members so wish. State threats are overt or covert actions by foreign Governments that fall below armed conflict but go beyond legitimate diplomacy to harm UK interests. They present a persistent and evolving risk to the United Kingdom and our allies, manifesting across a wide spectrum of activity, including interference in democratic processes, acquisition of sensitive information, threats to public safety, and disruption of economic security. Noble Lords will know that certain states have both the intent and the capability to conduct such activity to advance their objectives. This activity is often opportunistic, adaptive, increasingly integrated across multiple domains, and combining physical, cyber, economic and information tools. The threats are both evolving and enduring, and our legislation must keep pace. In December 2024, the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned Jonathan Hall KC, in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, to conduct a review into the tools available in terrorism legislation and how they may be applied to the problem of state threats. I...
My Lords, I begin by welcoming at long last the Government’s decision to bring this legislation forward. I say “at long last” advisedly and not as mere partisan point-scoring. This House will recall that the Opposition pressed the Government on no fewer than three separate occasions during the passage of the Crime and Policing Act in the previous Session to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On three occasions, the House voted in favour of our amendments; on three occasions, the Government voted against them. Ministers resisted, delayed and demurred until, ultimately, the weight of public pressure, the urging of the Jewish community and the reality of what is happening on our streets became impossible to ignore. The Prime Minister made his announcement and here we are. We do not begrudge the Government their change of position; we welcome it. The direction of travel is right, and this side of the House wants to see the Bill pass. But the circumstances of its arrival matter, because they help explain the deficiencies in the Bill as drafted. This legislation draws directly from the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whose report was published 14 months ago. Yet we are now told that this is so urgent that the Government will not consider any amendments, which is highly disappointing, given that the Bill before us today contains gaps that, if not rectified, risk rendering its central purpose unenforceable- I will...
My Lords, the Liberal Democrats support the principles of the Bill. We have been clear that we also want this legislation on the statute book and we will not seek to hold it up. We fully recognise the unprecedented security challenges that we face, confronting more serious and less predictable threats than at any time since the Cold War. In 2025 alone, MI5 reported a 35% increase in state threat activity on the previous year, including more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil. We are in accord with the Government. This activity must be stopped. However, while we will not obstruct the Bill, our support is not a blank cheque for lawmaking. The Bill was introduced just 13 days ago and was rushed through the other place in less than six hours. That begs the question: why did it take 14 months to act on recommendations from Jonathan Hall KC, which were accepted in full in May 2025? To ask this House to deliver a watertight defence in a single afternoon is a tall order and risks the Bill being seen as a rapid answer rather than a complete answer. Such accelerated progress risks important areas not being properly covered or provisions having unintended consequences. Good legislation also involves scrutiny and input from outside Parliament. The media and experts from a wide range of professional fields are normally critical in improving a Bill. However, the speed of this Bill’s passage runs a real risk that much-needed external scrutiny will be missed. The...
My Lords, I support the Bill, based as it is on a proposal from my admirable successor as independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC. It is regrettable that the Bill is being brought forward more than a year after his recommendation, yet in a manner that telescopes and truncates the debate in both Houses. How much more useful and productive it would have been to have seen a draft Bill, its scrutiny unrestrained by tight deadlines and positions already taken. My remarks today are aimed not at what the Bill intends to do but at the law which, I am afraid, it exemplifies: the law of unintended consequences. Two of the new offences, in proposed new Sections 17B and 17C, have the potential to damage conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and humanitarian activity-endeavours in which this country excels-in parts of the world controlled by bodies liable to designation. I shall explain briefly why that is and how I think the problem might be resolved. I declare a non-pecuniary interest as a chair of Inter Mediate, an independent peacemaking charity founded in 2011 by Jonathan Powell, who is now, of course, the Government’s National Security Adviser. Inter Mediate’s staff work discreetly at the highest political levels to support complex negotiations and conflict resolution in some of the most troubled parts of the world. It will not surprise noble Lords to learn that work of that kind requires intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult, even...
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I very much look forward to hearing him develop those points in Committee. Let me begin directly. Legislation of this kind is long overdue. As the Library briefing makes clear, the character of state threats has evolved over the years, and this legislation is necessary. It is not a criticism directed solely at this Government; successive Administrations have recognised the problem with reasonable clarity but have often been slow in delivering the remedy. We identify the threat, hesitate on the response and find ourselves, once again, playing catch-up. This Bill is an attempt to close that gap. It is necessary and welcome. There is much within it that merits support: the updating of offences; the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme; and the broader recognition, reflected in the Library material and other briefings, that hostile activity now spans a wide spectrum-it is no longer confined to classical espionage but extends into influence operations, economic pressure, covert funding and a steady shaping of information environments. However, necessity should not be mistaken for sufficiency. My concern is that the Bill, while well-intended, is framed too much around the threats that we already understand rather than those that are evolving. Hostile actors adapt quickly. They learn from our frameworks and adjust their methods accordingly. If we legislate narrowly or too rigidly, we will find that the...
I welcome the Bill. The fact that we need it less than three years after the passing of the National Security Act demonstrates the evolving threat that this country faces. In 2020 the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I chair, published its ground-breaking Russia report. I gently remind the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that it took three years for the then Government to implement most of the recommendations in that report, including the FIRS. Since then, we have produced in 2023 our report on China and in 2025 our report on Iran, and all pose a threat to UK security. The playbook they use is very similar: sabotage, cyber attacks, intimidation of the diaspora, misinformation, kidnapping, assassination in some cases-all carried out not just in this country but across Europe. Many examples can be found in open source material. Their strategy is not only well thought out but well funded. It is to undermine the trust in government, increase social division, weaken the rules-based order and, in Russia’s case, try to limit our support for Ukraine. After the attack in Salisbury, thanks to the efforts of our security services and our international partners, we have made the operating environment in the UK and across Europe far more difficult for these actors. That is why they have gone to using proxies. Again, it is not just about acts of sabotage. There have been good examples across Europe, such as shopping centres in Poland being attacked. Earlier this year I was in Latvia,...
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. We have had many conversations about national security over the years and have not always agreed, but he knows what he is talking about, and I agree with him on this Bill. This is a necessary Bill, and the sense of urgency is necessary too. As others have said, the National Security Act 2023 was a big step forward. I welcome the cross-party approach that we had to that and have to national security matters generally. It is a huge help, including for those to whom we have already paid tribute in our services, our operating partners and the police. However, threats change, our enemies adapt, and we must respond; as others have said, we must do so at pace and not get left behind. There has already been reference to Sir Ken McCallum’s comment that he saw a 35% increase in the number of individuals being investigated for involvement in state threat activity. I remember once being told off by a Prime Minister for “beguilingly precise” statistics, but the picture is what I recognise, including from my time as National Security Adviser and my time reading all the intelligence. We need to respond. As I am sure those who know him would agree, Sir Ken is the sort of person who would tell you, in the same calm, professional tone, that you had won the lottery or that your house had burned down. We must not let that professionalism mask the day in, day out reality of what we are facing in terms of the threat to this...
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Barrow. I agree with his comments. Like him, I welcome the Bill, and, like him, I think we have been waiting a long time for it. It is not just that it seems to have taken the Government a long time to get going on the issue; it is that real life affects those who are at risk, not only the Jewish community but certainly and definitely that community, so we need to get on with this legislation, and I am therefore among those who do not support further delay. The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson-for me, they introduce a new element, but one that quite clearly has real force-require us to try to get a balance between, on the one hand, contact with organisations of which we deeply disapprove and whose activities are malign, but for purposes that serve our interests and which are for the general good, and, on the other, not creating loopholes by inventing, if I can put it that way, motives that would lead to the courts excusing their conduct. It is not difficult to see that a defence could make it quite difficult for the prosecution to land its point if there is an argument in court about motivation and it has to prove that it was for a prohibited purpose. One thing that we need to concentrate on in the short time we have is getting some careful drafting into the legislation to get the balance right. The Minister said, and I see his point, that he could not guarantee that this legislation would actually...
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, who has such deep expertise in this area. I support this Bill which, as others have said, is long overdue, and draw attention to my membership of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy-a point to which I will return. It hardly needs repeating that we live in a deeply dangerous and volatile world and face an array of rapidly evolving threats to our national security. Geopolitics is rapidly changing and we must be ready to respond and place the national security of the country at the top of our agenda. As we have already heard, this Bill builds on the National Security Act 2023 and is intended to strengthen the UK’s ability to deter, detect and disrupt threats from foreign states and their proxies, including by introducing a new power to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity. We have also heard that the Bill follows the review by the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall KC into whether existing terrorism powers could be used to address these state threats. Well over a year ago, he found that the terrorism proscription charges would not be appropriate, so instead we have this legislation which will now designate bodies, including proxies, and be applied to bodies such as the IRGC or the Wagner Group. The geopolitical context is stark. We face very different threats from Russia, China and Iran and must be able to respond to them all individually. It is not a case of one size fits all....
My Lords, no one should be under any illusion about the dangers facing the United Kingdom, principally from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Whether it is assassins hunting down and murdering Alexander Litvinenko, or attempting to kill Sergei Skripal in Salisbury; the attack on the Prime Minister’s London home; the hate-driven scourge of antisemitism; cyber attacks-recall North Korea’s crippling cyber attack on the National Health Service in 2017-hacking and false narratives poisoning minds through social media; the presence of Chinese spies, even inside the Government and Parliament, with two more sentenced last week; or bounties on the heads of British residents and coercive sanctions on parliamentarians, it is clear that these are dangerous times. I have the honour to chair the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Across several reports, we have highlighted threats to both national security and the human rights of our citizens-two sides of the same coin. We condemned the failure to bring to justice 400 British citizens who enlisted in ISIS, committed genocide against Yazidis and other minorities in northern Iraq, and then returned to the United Kingdom. Not one of them has been prosecuted for genocide or crimes against humanity. How many of them have the Government assessed as a future security threat? As we have heard, MI5’s chief says that threats have risen by more than a third in a single year, with over 20 Iranian-inspired plots to kill, maim or kidnap on our...
My Lords, I too support the Bill and commend the Government for bringing forward this long-awaited legislation. I join others in paying tribute to Jonathan Hall KC, who has done much of the work that has paved the way for this legislation, both as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation. As he repeatedly pointed out, we cannot deal with state threats, including state terrorism, by simply using the same approach that we have used for terrorism legislation. There are political, diplomatic and legal differences. One of the key legal reasons why state threats need a different approach is that state officials enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction in our courts in respect of their official conduct. I suspect that immunity is one of the main reasons why the Government decided that we cannot have a straightforward membership offence which mirrors the offence under general terrorism legislation. My questions are about the scope of some of the offences, and in particular new Section 17B of the National Security Act 2023, the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, which would be introduced by Clause 2. To understand the reach of the offences, it may be helpful to test them against some examples, and I have two. The first is that of an IRGC plotter based in Tehran who has co-ordinated attacks by proxies in the United Kingdom. If that IRGC plotter happened to fly to the United Kingdom, or to another country from which...
My Lords, I welcome this Bill and look forward to making sure that its passage is as quick as the Minister wants, but of course, there will be amendments that need to be addressed. I want to focus on two or three questions that I will put directly to the Minister. My concern is around AI, which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, raised. The use in this country of AI in two or three areas really concerns me. The social contract between the people and the state has broken down quite a lot in recent years. Technologies are being used through people born and brought up here to attack their own country. Can the Minister explore the way we protect our critical infrastructure? How do we ensure that those who manage and run it are well-versed in how to protect it, and that internal or external influences do not attack our country and bring it to a standstill? The energy sector is a prime target, but we have seen attacks on Marks & Spencer and on hospitals. These attacks can be carried out by people sitting in our own country, using artificial intelligence and other means to get into our systems. This takes me to the other point I want the Minister to consider. Given that we are outsourcing so much of our work to other countries, how do we make sure that, while we are not directly impacted in the UK, information that belongs to the people of this country is not being targeted by foreign actors outside the country, in places where we are utilising outsourcing? Finally, I am concerned about...
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Verma. I welcome the opportunity to speak on the Bill. The first duty of any Government is to ensure the safety and security of the people they serve. In an increasingly uncertain world, where hostile state activity can take many forms, from espionage and cyber attacks to foreign interference and intimidation, it is right that Parliament considers how best to respond to those threats. I therefore support the principles behind the Bill and the Government’s determination to ensure that those acting on behalf of hostile foreign powers cannot undermine our national security, our way of life or the safety of the people living in our country. The threats posed by hostile states are real and evolving. They can affect individuals, communities and our democratic institutions, and it is right that the Government respond to them. As the Bill progresses, I hope we will also recognise the importance of community trust and cohesion in strengthening our response to those threats. Many of our towns and cities are home to vibrant diaspora communities with deep family, cultural and historical connections across the world. These communities make an enormous contribution to our society, economy and public life. It is important to recognise that diaspora communities can themselves be the target of intimidation, harassment and surveillance by hostile foreign actors. Indeed, some diaspora communities are among those most directly...
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Dacres. She was absolutely right to remind us that the Bill is not an esoteric subject, nor is it part of some kind of sophisticated spy novel, but that, rather, it affects potentially every citizen in this country, and that is why it is so important. As she said, it is the first duty of government to protect its citizens from harm, and that is exactly what is being done by the delivery of the Bill. Therefore, in principle, and in most of its content, I support the Bill entirely. I am very grateful to Jonathan Hall KC, my successor-but-three as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation -how to feel old in one sentence-who has done an excellent job. On the subject of Jonathan Hall, I remind noble Lords who have called for a review after 12 months that he is in fact required by law to give a review after 12 months, so that amendment is entirely unnecessary, with great respect to those who suggested it. I remind noble Lords, too, that every Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and Jonathan Hall in his current role as Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, can of his own volition and motion create a report at any time. My successor as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, my noble friend Lord Anderson, his successor, and Jonathan Hall and I have all done exactly that, or at least made moves to do exactly that, and have obtained proportionate and helpful reactions from...
My Lords, national security is, of course, a fundamental responsibility of government. We all recognise that the nature of security threats has changed significantly. We know that we need to step up our military preparedness, but we now also increasingly face challenges such as cyber attacks, foreign interference in democratic processes and indirect covert operations. We need not only to build national resilience but to tackle such threats and others as they evolve. We all share that aim. Jonathan Hall KC was asked to identify gaps in our legislation, and the Government aim to tackle some of these in this fast-track Bill. The Government have had over a year in which to address these gaps, yet they came forward with this Bill only in the past few weeks and expect it to be rushed through Parliament. That is rarely a recipe for good legislation, so it is vital that we examine it carefully to ensure that there are no unintended consequences-a concern that many noble Lords have already flagged. As I read the Bill, I wondered whether some of the people potentially implicated in recent attacks would be covered; the Bill covers those who would or should know for whom they might be working. There is a new development whereby young men in particular are being recruited online for tempting cash payments to take photos of venues or even to carry out attacks. They never think that foreign state involvement might lie behind these activities. Some have termed these actors “useful idiots”....
My Lords, no one can be under any illusion about the nature of the threats we face. Other noble Lords have spoken about this in some detail, so I will not be repeating that. It is right that the Government seek to update our laws in response. I pay tribute to Jonathan Hall KC, whose careful review has identified areas where the law requires strengthening. The Bill introduces significant offences relating to organisations associated with foreign state threats. I welcome the Government’s clear intention to close loopholes, address the use of proxy actors and strengthen deterrence. However, in pursuing those objectives, I have three concerns. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has already pointed out, we must not create uncertainty for those who work for and serve an altogether different purpose. Humanitarian organisations and development agencies, including conflict resolution experts, operate in some of the most fragile and dangerous environments in the world. I have seen the value of their work first-hand, not only as a supporter of their work but as a recipient of their aid when my own family was displaced by conflict. Humanitarian work is often challenging and uncomfortable. In conflict zones, engagement with de facto authorities is frequently unavoidable in order to negotiate access to civilian populations, obtain permits, rent premises, pay utility charges, employ local staff or secure safe passage through territory controlled by actors humanitarian organisations...
My Lords, I think this is the first time ever that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and I am delighted to do so. I begin by thanking the Minister and his officials for meeting some of us and going through the Bill in detail. I welcome the Bill, as so many others do, but continue to believe that there is a lack of clarity on some important issues and that this may result in unintended consequences-a very well-rehearsed phrase in the context of this debate. The points that I would have wished to make have been eloquently reiterated by many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord Anderson, so I am going to cut to the chase in a minute, although I would add that some of the points that have been made repeatedly are so serious that they bear repetition. My main concern remains the danger that humanitarian organisations could fall foul of a future law that forbids supporting or assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefits from such a body. As we have heard, designated bodies could include emergency assistance and/or development aid bodies, peacebuilding bodies and demining organisations which deal with sensitive material-as indeed does Inter Mediate. These entities regularly communicate with foreign government departments that are likely, under the terms of the Bill, to be designated. One example given by the Norwegian Refugee Council concerned a tax rebate rightfully owed to it by the Iranian Government. Another concern is the stringent bank...
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. I was not entirely persuaded that this Bill was strictly necessary. I remind the House that Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese Government, and for many years that fact was cited as a reason not to proscribe the organisation in its entirety. Yet in 2019, Hezbollah was fully proscribed without the need for new primary legislation. However, I accept that the threats posed by hostile threats and their proxies are real, and for that reason I support the Bill. For years, hostile states have sought to undermine our democracy and intimidate and threaten communities within the United Kingdom. The Jewish community has lived with this reality for decades. Synagogues, schools and community centres have required extraordinary levels of security. Families have become accustomed to armed protection outside places of worship. My own grandchildren are growing up believing that security barriers and guards are simply part of Jewish life in Britain. That is not normal, nor should it ever be accepted as normal. Allow me to thank the police, the security services, the CST and Shomrim, which have protected and protect the community-but they should all be doing other things. The Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use intimidation, proxies, surveillance and violence against those it regards as its enemies. It has exported instability, extremism and fear far beyond its borders. These threats are real,...
My Lords, we have already heard a lot about how our adversaries are looking at the UK and seeing a permissive environment for causing chaos, as well as recruiting foot soldiers on the same social media platforms they use to manipulate the British people-which, incidentally, they have been doing for years. This subversion is not new. It has been grinding away at our democracy since well before the Brexit referendum. Some of us remember it vividly. I remember scrolling through my feeds years ago and receiving highly targeted anti-EU questionnaires on social media. Platforms such as Facebook were not just places to connect: they were actively weaponised to push anti-EU propaganda in order to manufacture chaos and systematically shatter public trust in not just the EU but the United Kingdom’s core institutions. What we are seeing today is simply the terrifying escalation of that campaign. According to the briefing by the House of Lords Library, MI5 has just dropped a metric confirming that investigations into hostile state activity have skyrocketed by 35% in a single year. This is no longer just a quiet war of digital propaganda: the line between foreign espionage and domestic terror has evaporated completely. First, let us look at how our adversaries have moved from online manipulation to physical violence. It should come as absolutely no surprise that our major political parties, most vital companies and public infrastructure are being targeted relentlessly, but let us discard...
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Gill, in what has been an informative, if alarming, debate-alarming because it has highlighted the degree to which the freedoms which my grandparents’ generation fought and died for are now under grave threat. The need for this Bill underlines how much the social context has changed, as my noble friend Lady Verma alluded to. I doubt that the older generation could have anticipated just how strong a sense of entitlement to those freedoms their great-grandchildren would develop. It is as if their great-grandparents’ sacrifice, made in blood, sweat and tears, was ancient history, something that belonged in a Hollywood blockbuster, but which was irrelevant to today’s apparently so much more sophisticated world. I suspect that, having made that sacrifice in order that we might be free from the racist, genocidal, Jew-hating Nazis, my grandparents’ generation would appreciate far more than we do the trouble we are in and the urgency of getting the measures in this Bill, and perhaps others, on to the statute book. They would see the extent to which the threat to our democracy posed by hostile states’ use of proxies and malign non-state actors is exacerbated by society’s privileged, desensitised indifference to the danger they pose. The Lord Privy Seal said shortly before we began this debate that the public do not appreciate the threat. I agree with her, but I would go further. I fear that some are in denial, desperately...
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, and other noble Lords. I thank the Minister for the measured and thoughtful way in which he introduced Second Reading. As many have said, there is no more important issue facing our country than our national security and, more broadly, our defence. We are living in the most dangerous period in Europe since the 1930s. That is not hyperbole or geographic sophistry. I studied at the Rostov technical institute in 1990, during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Rostov, on the bank of the River Don, our hosts would proudly point to the other bank and tell us, “That is where Europe starts”. We might have said that it is where Europe ends. But that is where a war in Europe between Ukraine and Russia has now lasted longer, for each country, than in both world wars. That Russia is a hostile state with few if any sympathies for western democratic norms or our liberal institutions is beyond doubt. That we live in a dangerous world that is getting more dangerous is also beyond doubt. As has been mentioned many times, the director-general of MI5 has openly reported a substantial increase in the number of investigations of state threat activities. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others, have mentioned, the convictions just last week of a Romanian and a Ukrainian national for arson on property connected to our Prime Minister shows how emboldened bad actors have become. I know that the Minister will not wish to name...
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow that thoughtful speech from the noble Lord, Lord Docherty. There is one person who I wish we could have heard from today: our dear friend Meta, Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale. She was such an extraordinary expert on these issues for many years in the House and in her career as an intelligence officer. We said goodbye to her at a very moving funeral last Friday in Glasgow. I was gathering memories and stories about Meta, and one that is pertinent to share just now is when she gave a speech, I think in Tel Aviv, on Iran. This erudite, softly spoken woman, who everyone really wanted to be their great-aunt, gently said that the IRGC “must be eliminated-and I really do mean eliminated”. My friend recalled the jaw of the British ambassador next to him dropping as she said that. Those words are pertinent, because I really hope that the Minister will listen to that and agree to be a little bit more Meta on this Bill. Although I welcome it like everybody else, it does not achieve the Government’s and Jonathan Hall’s stated aim of an equivalent measure to terrorist proscription. It is weaker in an array of respects; there are excuses provided by the Government for each, but the cumulative effect is a significantly weaker regime. The noble Lord, Lord Polak, made a pertinent point about Hezbollah. Unlike the majority of noble Lords who have spoken-including learned noble Lords with much greater experience on the subject of terrorism-who appear to have...
My Lords, as my noble friends have said, we on these Benches strongly support the Bill, but with some caveats about process, scope and drafting. We felt bafflement and frustration as this Government-and indeed the last one-failed to act on the very obvious threat from the IRGC. The Conservative Government promised to in 2023 but did not deliver in office. But we then accepted that the tool of proscription had to be replaced by a new formula of designation for state bodies, although I note what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said about Hezbollah, which was interesting. Jonathan Hall KC’s report was delivered over a year ago, and now, having dragged their feet, the Government want to rush the Bill through at unseemly speed, and at the possible expense of precision. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, suggested, understandably, that a draft Bill might have been preferable. As the Minister said in his introduction, state threats are “both evolving and enduring”. The Bill needs to be scrutinised and stress-tested sufficiently in Committee that it produces lasting but nimble legislation, which is capable of future adaptation. We know that we are experiencing the equivalent of terrorist acts emanating from states such as Iran and Russia, in sabotage, physical attacks, arson, firebombing and propaganda-with Jewish communities often targeted, shamefully-as well as from China in spying, harassment and death threats to Hong Kong pro-democracy activists. Often proxies are used for these...
My Lords, I begin by thanking all noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House who have contributed to this thoughtful and stimulating debate. It is a great privilege to give the closing speech for the Opposition Benches, having heard from many noble Lords with a huge amount of expertise and experience in the legal, security and ISC sectors. Before reflecting on the specific provisions in the Bill we would like to see refined, it is worth outlining the context in which your Lordships have received this legislation. The Opposition Benches have long recognised the growing threat posed by hostile state actors and their proxies, and we wholeheartedly support the aim of strengthening the tools available to protect the UK’s national security. Of course, we support the general principles of the Bill and concur with the motivations behind it. I accept that the Bill goes beyond the IRGC. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, gave a long list of both threats and, sadly, events in the UK in recent years. The Bill rightly should cover state threats in general, but the IRGC is obviously and rightly the first target of the Bill. It is undeniable that the legislative provisions here should have been brought before Parliament long before now. For many months, noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House have repeatedly called for stronger action against the IRGC, most recently in the Committee and Report stages of the Crime and Policing Bill, where time and again calls were made from many different...
My Lords, I am grateful to the 24 noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, and I am particularly grateful, if I may say so, for the contributions from the Front Benches of HM loyal Opposition and the Liberal Democrats, the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Doocey, who gave broad support to the Bill but raised important questions-as did other noble Lords-which I will seek to respond to during the course of this debate. I pay tribute also to Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, who contributed to this House right up to very recently. The comments from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, were welcome. I start by reminding the House that this legislation was a manifesto commitment. According to Members today, it is long overdue or has been rushed. I am trying my best to find a happy medium that says that a manifesto commitment was put in place and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall KC to produce a report three or four months after the commitment in the manifesto was ratified by the electorate. We commissioned that report. The report was produced to this Government in May or June last year. We have had time to consider that report. Colleagues in the House will know that last year’s parliamentary Session was very busy and crammed, and we wanted to bring legislation forward at the first opportunity. At the first opportunity, in the gracious Speech, we brought forward this legislation, and we have brought it...
The Minister has referred a number of times to humanitarian aid and to diplomacy. Of course diplomats have a special defence or exemption of their own, but he has not said anything about those engaged in the prevention or resolution of conflict. I wonder if he would like to associate them with the statements he has made about humanitarian aid.
I am happy to do that, but I want to give clarity on these matters. If the noble Lord will allow me, given that that has been raised separately, I will write to him with an assurance on that and share that with both Opposition Front Benches so that they are aware of that. I want to give absolute legal clarity, as the noble Lord would expect, on these matters.
When is the Minister intending to meet the Red Cross?
Life and diaries are fluid, but it will be before Committee, Report and Third Reading of the Bill next week. So it will not be after that. It will be before that. As we speak, representations and diaries are being co-ordinated. I will leave it at that. The sixth vital point, which was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, is the issue of whether there will be a review. That is a valid and significant point but, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the National Security Act 2023 already gives the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation the right to oversight and mandates them to carry out an annual review of the operations of the provisions of the Bill. I hope that is sufficient to head off at the pass an amendment on this issue, not because an amendment would be right or wrong or unnecessary but because the Bill is already covered by the National Security Act on those particular points. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, mentioned in passing the question whether the offence of assisting a designated body would not capture non-UK nationals. I say to him that a non-UK national planning an attack in the UK from overseas would be materially assisting activities taking place in the UK. It is the activities of the designated body, such as an attack in the UK, that determine whether assistance is captured. The Bill also introduces the designated body condition,...
I am grateful for the opportunity to chew at the noble Minister’s ankles again. I want to ask him specifically whether he will continue the discussions that the Security Minister’s office has been having about the United Front Work Department that acts on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, which would not be covered by the terms of the Bill. Although I agree that he would not want to put actors on the face of the Bill, the generic issues that it involves should be there. Perhaps he could also take the opportunity of confirming whether he will circulate the reply that he has sent to me on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to Members who have spoken in today’s debate.
Absolutely. I will make sure that the reply I gave to the noble Lord in recent times is sent out, because this is moving at a fast pace and we are trying to get the matter sorted. I will do that for the noble Lord, and I will refer the points that he has made to the Security Minister. My noble friend Lady Dacres rightly mentioned the question of diaspora. The power is actor agnostic and applies equally to all individuals in the UK, so we are not targeting any particular diaspora. It targets conduct that is carried out for a purpose prejudicial to the UK’s safety. The question of-I use this phrase guardedly-“useful idiots” was quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and echoed by my noble friend Lady Gill. The new offences concern various thresholds for criminals to be caught. For example, criminals can be caught by the offence of assisting a designated body where they ought to know that their conduct is materially existing a designated body. However, it is also important to put on the record for the noble Baroness that criminals do not need to know that a group has been designated for offences to be committed. I hope that deals with the issue of “useful idiots”-I call them terrorists, but “useful idiots” is also a reasonable phrase that we can attribute to them. My noble friend Lady Gill and the noble Lord, Lord Docherty of Milngavie, mentioned the issue of how cryptocurrency used by designated bodies or individuals can be held more accountable. The Government have...
Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.